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CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
Western society is now more than three centuries past the scientific revolution, yet courts

continue to treat facts, and the scientific methods used to find those facts, much as the Catholic
Church did in the time of Galileo. This is especially so in the constitutional arena. The Supreme
Court considers the empirical world to be a constituent part of doctrine.1 Facts don’t so much
exist as serve to buttress a world view emanating out of a holy text. In the case of the High
Court, that text is the Constitution. But just as the Church lost credibility when it was dismissive
of science, the Court endangers its legitimacy by maintaining a jurisprudence that is inattentive to
scientific advances. In this Article, I propose both a theoretical justification for an empirically
enlightened constitutional jurisprudence and a framework through which such a jurisprudence
might be practiced. Given that the Constitution was framed on the principles of the
enlightenment, it is about time that the courts enter the scientific age.
1

See David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring the
Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (1991); see also
Rachel N. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of
Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655 (1988); Dean M. Hashimoto, Science as Mythology
in Constitutional Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 111 (1997); Adam Hoffman, Note, Corralling
Constitutional Fact: De Novo Fact Review in the Federal Appellate Courts, 50 DUKE L.J. 1427
(2001); Frank R. Strong, The Persistent Doctrine of “Constitutional Fact,” 46 N.C. L. REV.
(1968); Frank R. Strong, Dilemma Aspects of the Doctrine of “Constitutional Fact,” 47 N.C. L.
REV. 311 (1969); Jeffrey M. Shaman, Constitutional Fact: The Perception of Reality by the
Supreme Court, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 236 (1983); Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial
Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV. 111 (1988)..
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The Supreme Court habitually employs factual predicates in its constitutional
jurisprudence.2 Yet the Court has never developed an intelligible constitutional fact
jurisprudence. Indeed, the term itself is often used to describe only one type of fact – casespecific (or adjudicative) facts – when facts operate at multiple levels of constitutional
adjudication, from law definition to law application.3 No standards apply to courts’ reception of
constitutional fact-based evidence. Constitutional facts come to courts’ attention through expert
witnesses, legislative records, and briefs. Juries occasionally decide them and at other times
judges do so. There has never been an attempt to set procedural rules for constitutional factfinding. Burdens of proof are left, at best, implicit, and are usually overlooked completely.
Moreover, no general rules apply concerning the standard of appellate review of constitutional
facts. While a few scholars have weighed in on some of the issues presented by constitutional
facts,4 the subject remains adrift in an epistemological fog. Fact-finding at the Court seems to
occur in the twilight zone between doctrine and its application. Facts do not so much as inform
constitutional law as serve doctrinal choices made on other grounds. Inconvenient facts,
therefore, are interpreted – molded really – to conform to jurisprudential necessities. The Court’s
failure to develop a comprehensive constitutional-fact jurisprudence effectively gives it broad
latitude to find facts flexibly. The absence of any consistent conception of the place of facts in
constitutional cases permits the Court the freedom to employ facts unconstrained by principle.
2

See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LABORATORY OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT’S 200YEAR STRUGGLE TO INTEGRATE SCIENCE AND THE LAW (2004); I. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND
THE FOUNDING FATHERS (1995).
3

I use the term “constitutional fact” to refer to all facts used in constitutional cases,
whether they are relied upon to interpret the Constitution or are relevant to the application of
particular constitutional provisions. See Section II for a discussion of the different kinds of
constitutional facts.
4

The corpus of scholarship on the immense subject of constitutional fact-finding is
relatively small, though the subject has interested some better known scholars. See Kenneth
Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, SUP. CT. REV. 75 (1960); Laurence H.
Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36
HASTINGS L.J. 155(1984); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
229 (1985).
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In this Article, I propose a unified theory of constitutional facts. Section I sketches the
basic parameters of the Court’s current approach to constitutional fact-finding, which closely
adheres to what Professor Ronald Dworkin calls “interpretive” fact-finding. It is the Court’s
manner to treat facts as being highly malleable and to employ them to serve doctrinal ends. Facts
do not exist separately from the fact-finder; they are interpreted rather than found. They are
largely articles of faith. Interpretive fact-finding has the salutary effect that a changing factual
landscape will not endanger settled constitutional precedent. But this is their greatest weakness
too, for the Court’s approach neither accounts for nor provides a systematic method by which to
integrate changed factual understandings into constitutional doctrine. Ultimately, ignoring the
empirical component of constitutional adjudication will threaten the legitimacy of the Court’s
pronouncements.

Constitutional facts come in a variety of forms, with some serving to define the
Constitution’s meaning and others relevant only in particular cases. Section II describes the
different kinds of constitutional fact and discusses their relationship to one another and to
constitutional doctrine more generally. In addition, this section examines how different kinds of
constitutional fact might be proven in constitutional adjudication. Different facts demand
different procedural rules of proof, and this part considers the sources of proof and the sorts of
burdens of proof that should apply to the different levels of fact-finding in constitutional cases.

A large component of constitutional fact-finding lies in the dynamic between legal
decision-makers. Constitutional facts are found by all those charged with making decisions
having constitutional import, including, among others, police officers, school boards,
legislatures, juries, trial court judges, and appellate courts. A unified theory of constitutional
facts must account for the highly complex dynamic between these various decision-makers.
Section III considers this issue as regards facts found (or reviewed by) courts, up, down, and
across the judicial hierarchy. This part focuses on three principal areas in which this dynamic is
most prominent in constitutional adjudication. First, it examines judicial review of constitutional
-4-

facts found at trial and, in particular, the jury’s role in the constitutional law dynamic. Second, it
examines possibly the highest profile situation in constitutional adjudication, that of judicial
review of a legislature’s constitutional fact-finding. Finally, this section turns to possibly the
most controversial – and surely the most interesting – subject involving constitutional factfinding, whether lower courts can sometimes review the fact-finding of higher courts, and
thereby depart from precedent when the facts, or our knowledge of the facts, change.

I. “INTERPRETIVE” FACT-FINDING

Fact-finding is an essential component of both constitutional interpretation and
constitutional application. Historically, however, courts and commentators have sought to avoid
this essential truth – and for good reason. Facts are highly indeterminate and they inevitably
destabilize the sought-after stability of fundamental constitutional values. For instance, many
commentators were highly critical of the Supreme Court’s seeming reliance on social science
research in Brown v. Board of Education.5 In concluding that segregated schools were
“inherently unequal,” the Brown Court cited the work of Dr. Kenneth Clark and others that
indicated that blacks suffered psychological harm as a result of segregation.6 Many prominent
commentators challenged the Court’s use of science on the basis either that the findings were
obvious or largely irrelevant. Professor Ronald Dworkin, for example, beginning with a premise
from another scholar, argued both of these together:
“We don’t need evidence for the proposition that segregation is an insult to the Black
community – we know it; we know it the way we know that a cold causes snuffles.” It is
not that we don’t need to know it nor that there isn’t something there to know. There is a
fact of the matter, namely that segregation is an insult, but we need no evidence for that

5

347 U.S. 433 (1954). See, e.g., Edmund Cahn, “Jurisprudence,” 30 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 150, 157-58 (1955) (“I would not have the constitutional rights of Negroes – or of other
Americans – rest on any such flimsy foundation as some of the scientific demonstrations in these
records.”).
6

Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.11.
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fact – we just know it. It’s an interpretive fact.7
Dworkin’s term “interpretive fact” is a component of a legal theory he calls “creative” or
“constructive” interpretation.8 He analogizes constitutional interpretation to the writing of the
latest chapter of a chain novel.9 The interpreter fits his or her interpretations into the prior
chapters and, at the same time, extends the overall work in the “best possible” direction. The
theory contemplates first that the interpreter identify the “fit” between the interpretive history and
the practice being interpreted and, second, that the interpreter impose a “purpose on an object or
practice in order to make of it the best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken
to belong.”10

The difficulty in Dworkin’s formulation, for present purposes, lies in understanding the
role of science in this legal-interpretive discourse. Science certainly is used by the law as a
means to accomplish certain objectives. But science, at least good science, does not permit any
interpretation the interpreter desires, much less the “best possible.” Although science cannot
entirely divorce itself from its social context, sound science and reputable scientists have no
preset agendas about the proper shape that the world should take. The law, in contrast, is
7

Ronald Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights – The Consequences
of Uncertainty, J. L. & EDUC. 6 (1977): 3, 5 (quoting Cahn, supra note XX, 157-58).
8

A second component of Dworkin’s notion of interpretive facts is his belief that the
social sciences are not sufficiently valid to support constitutional rulings. For example, Dworkin
argues that “[w]hile in physics it is now thought to be an unsound judgment that rests merely on
correlation between observable events unsupported by some notion of the mechanics that
translate the cause to the effect, social science is only able to provide correlations without the
mechanics.” Id. Dworkin’s criticism displays an unhealthy amount of “physics envy.” See
David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as
Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005 (1989).
9

RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). See also Ronald Dworkin, Law as
Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527, 540-46 (1982). For an analysis of the chain novel
metaphor, see Stanley Fish, “Working on the Chain Gang’ Interpretation in Law and
Literature,” TEX. L. REV. 60 (1982): 551.
10

Dworkin (1986), supra note XX, at 52.
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primarily about setting such agendas. Whereas the insult associated with segregation may be
plain legally (at least after 1954), just how plain it is as a matter of science depends on the data.
How, then, should scientific interpretation be combined with legal interpretation? Although
Dworkin has yet to address this specific issue, his chain of logic can be considered in regard to its
application to the matter at hand.

If, as Dworkin apparently accepts, “there is a fact of the matter,” even such a fact as the
insult attributable to segregation, when is that “real-world” fact relevant and when is its
interpretive cousin relevant? If all constitutional facts are repackaged under Dworkin’s
definition as merely interpretive facts, this solves one problem by creating another one. It solves
the problem inherent in basing constitutional doctrine on indeterminate and changeable factual
premises. Accordingly, in the Brown example, it would not matter what quantum of evidence
might later be adduced to demonstrate the salutary attributes of state-sponsored segregation. If
the fact is interpretive, no amount of data could ever disprove the “fact” that segregation is
insulting. It is so, like other constitutional matters, because the Court says so. The problem this
fact-finding by fiat creates, however, is the almost certain erosion of the legitimacy of Court
pronouncements. Despite the elegance of Dworkin’s efforts, the empirical world still exists
outside the Court’s dictates. Facts are what they are, and the Court’s insistence otherwise makes
it appear dogmatic.

Dworkin’s approach relies on an expansive notion of “facts.” In his view, facts are elastic
enough to be able to serve the normative needs of the Constitution. But the question is, can we
make facts mean whatever we want them to mean? Dworkin seems to vacillate between
describing constitutional facts as a function of normative judgment and believing them to be a
matter of common sense experience. But the former – “normative facts” – are reminiscent of the
practices of the Sixteenth Century Catholic Church, and the latter resemble a caricatured version
of the Seventeenth Century inductive methods of Francis Bacon. We may know, as Dworkin
argues we should know “interpretively,” “that a cold causes snuffles.” But surely, if the
“interpretive” judgment is accurate, valid scientific studies should corroborate that judgment.
-7-

Science is not irrelevant for demonstrating what everyone believes to be the case, though courts
might wish to relegate studies corroborating the relationship between a cold and snuffles to a
footnote. And some day, to our surprise, it might turn out that a malady only associated with
colds causes snuffles, and that we were wrong the whole time. Certainly, researchers should not
be discouraged from studying the question on the basis that we know it to be true because we
know it to be true.

In practice, of course, so-called “interpretive facts” play a steadying role. This utility is
their virtue. Seen as an interpretive fact, the deleterious effects of segregation are not open to
reexamination. An interpretive fact thus corresponds neatly with traditional notions of
constitutional doctrine, in that neither need change except by dictate of the Court. Real facts, in
contrast, are mercurial. Given their proclivity for change, either because our knowledge of the
facts improves over time or the facts themselves change, they seem to provide a disturbingly
unsteady foundation for constitutional doctrine. Described as a factual matter, therefore, the
holding in Brown that blacks are disadvantaged by segregation would appear vulnerable to
refutation by well-designed studies that indicate that blacks are not disadvantaged or, even, are
better off with this practice. This is probably not an occurrence to which the Court gave much
thought when drafting the Brown opinion. Almost certainly, the justices would have agreed with
the gist of Dworkin’s argument, that changing facts regarding segregation’s insult did not
undermine the continuing validity of Brown. This proposition, however, was eventually tested in
a courtroom in Savannah-Chatham, Georgia.
In 1963, in Stell v. Savannah-Chatham,11 the county defended a desegregation suit on the
basis that black children were not, in fact, psychologically harmed by attending segregated
schools. The plaintiffs argued that the district court had no discretion to reopen this factual
question. According to the plaintiffs, it had been conclusively determined by the Supreme Court
in Brown that segregation harmed black children. The trial court in Stell disagreed. The court
explained that the lower court in Brown had found that “‘segregation with the sanction of law ...
11

220 F.Supp. 667 (S.D.Ga. 1963).
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has a tendency to (retard) the educational and mental development of Negro children and to
deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school
system.’”12 The judge stated, “[t]hese are facts, not law,” explaining:
Whether Negroes in Kansas believed that separate schooling denoted inferiority, whether
a sense of inferiority affected their motivation to learn was increased or diminished by
segregation was a question requiring evidence for decision. That was as much a subject
for scientific inquiry as the braking distance required to stop a two-ton truck moving at
ten miles an hour on dry concrete.13
Based on the expert testimony introduced in the case, the trial court concluded that “prejudices,
whether ethnic, religious or racial, increase rather than decrease in proportion to the degree of
non-voluntary contact between separately identifiable groups.”14 The court said that this “is a
psychological phenomenon which was noted in the time of Periclean Greece.”15 Moreover,
modern “studies made of actual intermixing of groups in classrooms confirm the predicted result
that an increase in cross-group contacts increases pre-existing racial hostility rather than
ameliorates it.”16

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit summarily reversed the Stell district court. The appellate
court admonished that “no inferior federal court may refrain from acting as required by [the
Brown] decision even if such a court should conclude that the Supreme Court erred either as to
its facts or as to the law.”17 Moreover, the circuit court discounted the importance of the social
science evidence for the Brown result. “We do not read the major premise of the decision of the
Supreme Court in the first Brown case as being limited to the facts of the cases there presented.

12

Id. at 677-78.

13

Id. at 678.

14

Id. at 674.

15

Id.

16

Id.

17

333 F.2d 55, 61 (5th Cir. 1964).
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We read it as proscribing segregation in the public education process on the stated ground that
separate but equal schools for the races were inherently unequal.”18

The Fifth Circuit effectively understood Brown “interpretively,” in that the facts set forth
in 1954 had become established law a decade later.19 This creative approach to constitutional
facts can be found in many cases.20 Typically, the Court’s first entry into a particular
constitutional arena involves an ostensibly serious evaluation of the relevant factual
underpinnings of the eventual holding. Subsequently, however, the precedent hardens into
established constitutional doctrine and, as a consequence, the factual premises petrify.21 If the
relevant facts were not “interpretive” at the start, they become so once the case has entered the
lexicon of settled law.

Treating facts interpretively solves the problem of having changeable constitutional
standards due to a changing understanding of the empirical world. The factual premises are
“interpreted” in conformance with the constitutional outcome, notwithstanding evidence to the
contrary. But this stability comes at a cost. A rule that has outlived its reasons for being is
correctly seen as illegitimate. As various justices have lamented, advancing technology threatens
the stability of established precedent in a multitude of constitutional contexts.22 If, for example,
18

Id.

19

The latter argument – that the major premise of Brown depended on the normative
proposition that segregated schools were “inherently unequal” – effectively reads the factual
dispute out of the decision.
20

See generally, Faigman (1991), supra note XX.

21

See, e.g., Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 458 (1983)
(Despite changes in medical technology that permitted abortions in 1983 to be performed more
safely than childbirth through at least week 16, the Court held that “[t]he Roe trimester standard
... continues to provide a reasonable legal framework for limiting a State’s authority to regulate
abortions.”); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (“‘[T]here is nothing inherently
unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct.’”) (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S.
253, 276 (1984)).
22

See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S.Ct. 2783 (2004). See generally Stuart Minor
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the right of reproductive choice is based on the medical concept of viability – the time after
which a fetus is likely to survive outside the womb – the Court’s failure to follow advancing
technology will undermine the cogency of the precedent. The rule in Roe v. Wade23 provides that
states cannot prohibit abortions pre-viability, a point-in-time of around 24-28 weeks in 1973 and
closer to 22-24 weeks today. However unlikely a technological revolution in viability might
appear today, advances in this area could move viability considerably closer to conception.24 If a
woman’s basic right of choice is truly based on the values associated with viability, then
presumably the right should change as technology changes.

But such a changeable constitutional jurisprudence could itself be derided as
illegitimate.25 Dworkin’s interpretive fact approach ingeniously resolves this dilemma, since
interpretive facts are as solid as the doctrine demands or as flexible as they need to be in order to
allow the doctrine to evolve. Under this approach, because constitutional facts are “interpreted”
and not “found,” justices can employ them with little fear that future researchers might call into
question the premises of their handiwork.

Yet, the world does not always cooperate with the wishes of the justices or constitutional
scholars. At least on occasion, scientists will demonstrate the errors in the Court’s factual
premises with enough certainty to engender doubt over the soundness of the Court’s logic.
Indeed, this can be expected to occur with increasing frequency as basic scientific methods
improve or the Court finds facts that are amenable to more definitive proof. Opinions that
employ facts interpretively are more reminiscent of holy writ than reasoned and informed legal
Benjamin, Stepping Into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts and the Appellate
Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269 (1999).
23

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

24

See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION (1990).

25

See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 754 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring)
(discussing need to avoid establishing constitutional standards on factual premises that might
change as more research is done).
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judgment. But there is no inherent contradiction between enlightened factual investigation and a
cogent constitutional jurisprudence. Constitutional doctrine should be informed by contemporary
understandings of the empirical world. By necessity, such an approach would take into account
the dynamic nature of fact-finding and science, albeit in combination with the critical need for
some measure of steadiness in constitutional doctrine.

Just how much unsteadiness would be created by a changeable factual landscape depends
on the kinds of facts that are changing. Some facts are used to establish the Constitution’s
meaning and underlie the doctrines that apply to all similarly situated claims. When these facts
change, whole areas of jurisprudence might be affected. Other facts have more limited scope,
involving only the immediate dispute and concern what happened to whom, where, and why.
These facts would have little impact across constitutional cases when they fluctuated. A
workable jurisprudence of fact-finding must account for every type of fact, and this, in turn, must
begin with the subject of the next section: categorizing the kinds of facts employed in
constitutional claims.

II. THE CONFIGURATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS

The Constitution was intended, and is generally considered, to be an eminently practical
document, so legal rules and decisions springing from it ought to be informed by the best
evidence available. Facts, whether they are the function of decades of Nobel-level research or
the anecdotal observations of a police officer, come to the legal system in a wide variety of ways.
Constitutional facts arrive in court through lay witnesses and expert testimony at trial,
congressional (or other legislative) hearing testimony, amicus briefs, a court’s own research, and
many others. In court, constitutional facts might be the subject of jury deliberations, judicial
determination, de novo appellate review, or some combination of all of these. The dynamic
among the different decision-makers ultimately depends upon the kinds of factual matters that
the Constitution makes relevant. Thus, as presented in Brown, whether the empirical
-12-

consequences of segregation by race are relevant in the first instance is a matter of constitutional
interpretation. Moreover, whether the focus is on the consequences at a particular school in a
particular city or on those effects nationally, is also a matter of constitutional interpretation.26 In
this section, I describe a framework by which the full range of constitutional facts can be
classified. Only once they have been sorted can an intelligible jurisprudence be applied to them.

A. A Taxonomy of Constitutional Facts
In a landmark article, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis identified two basic kinds of facts
having evidentiary significance.27 The first he termed “legislative facts,” and the second he
called “adjudicative facts.” According to Davis, legislative facts are those facts that have
relevance to legal reasoning and the fashioning of legal rules.28 Adjudicative facts, in contrast,
are relevant to the resolution of particular cases. In a later text, Davis explained, “[a]djudicative
facts usually answer the questions of who did what, where, when, how, why, with what motive or
intent.... Legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate parties but are general facts
which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion.”29 Judges typically
decide questions of legislative fact.30 Adjudicative facts, on the other hand, are usually within

26

See infra note XX (discussing confusion during oral argument in Brown as to
whether the challenge to segregation was based on evidence that applied generally or that only
concerned the locales that were the subject of the litigation).
27

Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-03 (1942).
28

See FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee’s note (“Legislative facts ... are
those which have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the
formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment of a legislative
body.”).
29

KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, § 7.03, at 160 (3d ed. 1972).

30

See id.; see also Davis, supra note XX, at 402 (noting that the rules of evidence
for finding facts that form the basis for creation of law and policy should differ from the rules for
finding facts specific to parties in a particular case).
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the province of the trier of fact (the jury or, if there is no jury, the judge) to decide.31

A key distinguishing feature between legislative and adjudicative facts is the level of
decision-making at which the asserted facts are relevant. Whereas legislative facts ordinarily
relate to matters that transcend individual disputes and would likely recur in different cases
involving similar subjects, adjudicative facts ordinarily are peculiar to a particular case.32 In
McCleskey v. Kemp,33 for example, the petitioner claimed that Georgia’s capital sentencing
scheme discriminated on the basis of the race of the victim. This allegation was based on an
extensive and sophisticated study conducted by David Baldus and his colleagues. Among other
things, Baldus concluded that, all things being equal, “defendants charged with killing white
victims were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing
blacks.”34 This discrimination claim was based on legislative facts, in that it was directed at the
Georgia system as a whole and McCleskey offered no evidence that he personally was a victim of
discrimination. As Justice Powell, writing for the Court, pointed out, “[e]ven Professor Baldus
does not contend that his statistics prove ... that race was a factor in McCleskey’s particular

31

Professors John Monahan and Laurens Walker expanded upon the Davis
dichotomy by adding a third category that they call “social frameworks.” Laurens Walker and
John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559,
563-570 (1987).
32

The reason I say “ordinarily” is that there is a basic ambiguity inherent in Davis’
categories. His division of facts into legislative and adjudicative categories is based on how the
fact-finder employs the particular fact. If the fact is used to resolve a particular litigation, it is, by
definition, “adjudicative.” This is so even though the factual issue may transcend a particular
dispute, such as whether second-hand smoke causes lung cancer or silicone implants cause
autoimmune disorders. Similarly, if a legislature points to a particular case to support its
lawmaking – as occurred in the “right-to-die” controversy involving Terri Schiavo in 2005 – this
particularized fact is, by definition, “legislative.” The scheme I develop in this section for the
constitutional arena largely avoids this ambiguity, because the generality or specificity of the
factual inquiry operates as the definitional feature of my framework.
33

481 U.S. 279 (1987).

34

Id. at 321.
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case.”35 Indeed, of great concern for the Court was that “McCleskey’s claim, taken to its logical
conclusion, throws into serious question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice
system.”36 Legislative facts, as their name connotes, typically have broad impact across large
areas of the law.

How the constitutionally relevant inquiry is described, therefore, as being at either the
adjudicative or legislative level, obviously is of great importance. In principle, the Constitution
itself establishes what sorts of facts are relevant under its dictates. In other words, the
description of the relevant factual inquiry under a particular provision of the Constitution is a
matter of interpretation. In the cases leading up to McCleskey, for instance, the Court had
indicated that substantial evidence of systemic discrimination would constitute an Eighth
Amendment violation.37 The relevant facts under this earlier interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment, then, were legislative in character. In McCleskey, however, the Court stepped away
from this precedent. In its new interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, the Court redefined the
level of relevant fact-finding. The McCleskey Court said that the relevant facts under the Eighth
Amendment were case specific, or adjudicative, and held that claims of systemic discrimination
were insufficient to sustain a cause of action. Under both the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, according to the Court, claimants had to demonstrate individualized
discrimination.

Davis’ dichotomy generally describes the kind of fact-finding that occurs in constitutional
cases and it has become the established vocabulary for describing the kinds of facts that are
relevant to legal discourse.38 My approach roughly parallels Davis’, though the constitutional

35

Id. at 308.

36

Id. at 314-15.

37

Id. at 323 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“A constitutional violation is established if a
plaintiff demonstrates a ‘pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing.’”) (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 195 n.46 (1976)).
38

Judge Robert Keeton has suggested the use of the term “premise facts” to describe
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arena requires refinement of his scheme. Davis’ legislative fact category can be further distilled
in the constitutional context into two subcategories, “constitutional rule-facts” and
“constitutional review-facts.”39 This revision turns out to have special relevance for constructing
procedural rules in constitutional cases.40

Constitutional rule-facts are advanced to substantiate a particular interpretation of the
Constitution. Constitutional rule-facts join, and sometimes are a component of, the traditional
sources of authority – the text, original intent, constitutional structure, precedent, scholarship,
and contemporary values – in establishing the meaning of the Constitution.41 Indeed, one of the
most common bases for constitutional interpretation, original intent, is almost wholly fact-based.
Most debates over original intent resolve down to disagreements over historical facts, such as
whether the drafters or ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment expected the Equal Protection
Clause to invalidate segregated public schools42 or whether the Free Speech Clause was intended
to cover obscenity.43 In addition, many arguments based on constitutional structure depend
either implicitly or explicitly on hypotheses that might be the subject of political science or
sociology. John Marshall’s assertion in Marbury v. Madison,44 for instance, that legislators are

any facts that support a reasoned decision of law or policy.” Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts
and Similar Things: Deciding Disputed Premise Facts, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1, 11 (1988).
39

[Identifying footnote removed.]

40

See Section III, infra (discussing different standards for when lower courts should
have the authority to reconsider constitutional legislative facts depending on whether they are
rule-facts or review-facts).
41

See Faigman, supra note XX, at 542-44; See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189, 124446 (19XX); Michael Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of
Constitutional “Interpretation,” 58 CAL. L. REV. 551, 552 (1985).
42

See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 433 (1954).

43

See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).

44

5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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less likely than judges to be bound by a written constitution, is a rule-fact of this sort.45 Rulefacts, therefore, are employed to determine or justify the development of rules or standards that
apply to all similarly situated cases. Constitutional doctrine, of course, is replete with examples
of such rules, including tiered-scrutiny in due process and equal protection, the Millertest for
obscenity,46 Brandenburg’s incitement test,47 Crawford’s test of testimonial evidence under the
Confrontation Clause,48 and so on. Many of these were developed, in part, on the basis of factual
arguments. Moreover, virtually all of them establish constitutional inquiries that are answerable
only by review-facts or adjudicative-facts.

Constitutional review-facts embody the more generally recognized function of legislative
fact-finding in constitutional cases. Courts examine constitutional review-facts under the
pertinent constitutional rule or standard in order to determine the constitutionality of some state
or federal action. Review-facts transcend particular disputes and thus can recur in identical form
in different cases and varying jurisdictions. Under the Commerce Clause, for instance, the
applicable standard asks, among other things, whether the federal law “substantially affects
interstate commerce.”49 A good example comes from Gonzales v. Raich,50 in which the Court
determined whether Congress had the authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate the home
production of marijuana. Under the applicable standard, the Court had to consider whether
Congress had a rational basis for concluding that home production of marijuana substantially
affects price and national market conditions for marijuana.51 After reviewing the record and
45

Id. at 137 (“The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those
limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the Constitution is written”).
46

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).

47

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).

48

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

49

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942).

50

125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005).

51

Id. at 2197.
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Congress’ reasons for regulating, the Court concluded that “the regulation is squarely within
Congress’ commerce power because production of [marijuana] ... has a substantial effect on
supply and demand in the national market for that commodity.”52 The Court explained that
“[o]ne need not have a degree in economics to understand why a nationwide exemption for the
vast quantity of marijuana ... locally cultivated for personal use (which presumably would
include use by friends, neighbors, and family members) may have a substantial impact on the
interstate market for this extraordinarily popular substance.”53 The Court concluded that
“Congress’ judgment is not only rational, but ‘visible to the naked eye,’ under any commonsense
appraisal of the probable consequences of such an open-ended exemption.”54

Constitutional rule-facts and constitutional review-facts involve factual determinations
that transcend particular cases and are relevant to either the formation of a constitutional rule or
the application of a rule to similarly occurring cases, respectively. Constitutional adjudicativefacts, in contrast, refer to factual determinations that are relevant to the application of
constitutional rules in particular cases. For example, the question whether a police department
“intentionally discriminated” against black police officers when it made promotion decisions
based on an exam on which whites received significantly higher scores raises a constitutional
adjudicative-fact issue. Similarly, the likely consequences of Nazis marching through a
predominantly Jewish neighborhood in Skokie, Illinois would be a constitutional adjudicativefact. Adjudicative-facts, as their name implies, are specific to a particular proceeding and their
resolution has limited precedential import.

Unfortunately, no bright lines mark the boundaries between different kinds of
constitutional facts. Because the procedural standards developed in Section III depend on these
categorizations, however, ambiguity in this area is a matter of some consequence. More

52

Id. at 2197.

53

Id. at 2212.

54

Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563).
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problematic still, uncertainty surrounding categorization arises across the entire spectrum of
constitutional facts. The process of determining what facts are constitutionally relevant and what
category they fall into must be determined on a case-by-case, or constitutional-provision by
constitutional-provision, basis. The next section explores the variables by which constitutional
facts might be classified and the vagaries that attach to that scheme.

B. Classifying Constitutional Facts
Constitutional rule-facts are marked by their relevance to the formation or justification of
constitutional rules or standards. Recognizing a constitutional rule-fact as such often will be
fairly straightforward. One of the most famous examples of a constitutional rule- fact comes from
the litigation of Brown v. Board of Education. The case was first heard during the Court’s 195253 term. Led by Chief Justice Vinson, a divided Court held the case over to the following term.
The Court issued a series of questions for the parties to answer upon re-argument. Several of
these were directed at the historical question whether the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment
had intended to invalidate segregated public schools by guaranteeing the equal protection of the
laws.55 In the opinion, Chief Justice Earl Warren, who had replaced Vinson, found that the
historical materials were “not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best,
they are inconclusive.”56 The historical fact of the drafters’ and ratifiers’ intentions regarding the
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment was thus ostensibly relevant to the meaning it was to be
given, though in the end the Court believed that these facts were known with too little certainty
to be relied upon. Other authorities would have to be used.

55

Historians have since discovered that the Court was never particularly interested
in the answer to this question, since, even before reargument, a majority supported invalidating
segregation on other grounds. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975). But the year delay
had monumental consequences. Chief Justice Vinson died that summer and was replaced by Earl
Warren. Chief Justice Warren orchestrated a unanimous opinion in the case that has come to
symbolize the inception of modern constitutional jurisprudence. See generally MICHAEL J.
KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS (2004).
56

Brown, 347 U.S. at 489.
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Rule-facts and review-facts both transcend individual cases, but the former are
distinguishable on the basis that they are relevant to the definition of a constitutional rule,
whereas the latter are relevant under some already defined constitutional rule. Frequently,
however, the line between constitutional rule-facts and constitutional-review facts is indistinct.
The more controversial factual issue in Brown involved the Court’s citation to research
indicating the negative effects of segregation on black school children. But was this evidence
used to support a categorical rule prohibiting segregation by race, or was it proof that was
relevant under a different rule, one that queried whether the state had a sufficient justification for
its discriminatory treatment? The cases decided immediately after Brown suggest the former
interpretation, that the studies were employed in service of a new per se rule prohibiting
segregation by race. After all, following Brown, the Court invalidated discrimination in a wide
variety of public contexts and, along the way, never again mentioned social science data.57
Under this interpretation, the social science of Brown, to the extent that it had any value at all,
was merely employed to justify a new rule of law.
With the benefit of hindsight, however, it appears that the constitutional issue of
segregation’s effects is a review-fact and not a rule-fact.58 The modern rule provides that
57

See New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958)
(per curiam) (parks and recreational facilities); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per
curiam) (buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (golf courses);
Mayor of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) (beaches and
bathhouses); see also Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding
unlawful racial discrimination in restaurants in public buildings).
58

At oral argument in Brown, there was some confusion regarding whether
segregation’s effect was an adjudicative fact or a legislative fact. In the trials below, the
petitioners had produced evidence on both issues, introducing general social science research
conducted years earlier and also litigation-generated research in which students in the respective
jurisdiction were tested using Kenneth Clark’s notorious doll-tests. At the argument, the
NAACP’s Robert Carter asked the Court to abide by the Topeka case’s finding of fact that
segregation had deleterious psychological consequences. He told the Court that the district
judge’s factual findings make a reversal “necessary.” He argued, “[i]f there [are inequalities] in
fact, that educational opportunities cannot be equal in law.” Justice Hugo Black asked him
whether that was “‘a general finding or do you state that for the State of Kansas, City of
Topeka?” Surprisingly, Carter told the justices that “the finding refers to the State of Kansas and
to these appellants and to Topeka, Kansas.” He added, “I think that the findings were made in
this specific case referring to this specific case.” Black was troubled by the ramifications of
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discrimination by race (or segregation) is unconstitutional unless the state’s scheme is justified
by a compelling objective and the means used are closely tied to achieving that end.59 If
Michigan, for example, were to create an all-black high school in Detroit that emphasized an
African-American curriculum, the state’s means and ends would be strictly scrutinized rather
than invalidated under some per se rule emanating from Brown and its progeny. Presumably, any
defense of this segregation scheme would be based largely on social science research regarding
the benefits that would accrue to black students from a segregated high school education.60 The
rule of Brown and its progeny seems to be that segregation by race is highly suspect, but that it
may be possible for a state to justify such disparate treatment if its reasons are sufficiently
compelling. But, admittedly, the matter is not free of all ambiguity. Nothing inherent in a
particular constitutional fact dictates whether it is a rule- or review-fact. Categorization depends
on how a particular court employs the fact, and this might only be determined in particular
constitutional contexts by subsequent case law.61

limiting the empirical lesson to the single case of Topeka and asked whether this meant that
“then you would have different rulings with respect to the places to which this applies, is that
true?” Carter quickly realized his error, though in his haste to backtrack he too readily
abandoned the general social science available. He argued, “[n]ow, of course, under our theory,
you do not have to reach the finding of fact or a fact at all in reaching the decision because of the
fact that we maintain that this is an unconstitutional classification being based upon race and,
therefore, it is arbitrary.” MARK WHITMAN, ed., REMOVING A BADGE OF SLAVERY 131-32 (1993).
59

See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying strict
scrutiny to race-conscious affirmative action programs).
60

See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (In this case involving
gender segregation at VMI, much of the litigation proceeded on the assumption that the State
could, if its reasons were compelling enough, justify separate military training for men and
women.).
61

The sometimes ambiguous character of constitutional facts complicates the task of
establishing a rational constitutional-fact jurisprudence, but it is not fatal to that effort and this
level of uncertainty is not unknown in constitutional cases. Consider, for example, the
longstanding debate over whether the Miranda rule was constitutionally mandated or a judicially
enacted remedy that could be revisited by legislative majorities. This ambiguity remained in the
law for more than 30 years. Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (setting forth the
now-famous “Miranda warning,” but leaving open the question whether it was constitutionally
based) with Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (“Miranda announced a
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The line distinguishing constitutional adjudicative-facts from other constitutional facts
can also be elusive. In principle, adjudicative facts should be readily recognizable.
Constitutional adjudicative-facts involve only the case before the respective court and their
resolution should have little or no precedential value. Under the Millertest, for instance, one of
three necessary findings of fact involves whether the allegedly offending materials appeal to the
prurient interest.62 This fact is determined on a case-by-case basis in light of local community
standards. A finding in a Lexington, Virginia court that a particular Mapplethorpe photograph is
obscene, therefore, does not bind a court in Richmond, Virginia that might be evaluating the
same photograph. Similarly, in a libel action under New York Times v. Sullivan,63 the question
whether a false statement was made with “actual malice” will be unique to that particular case.
Categorizing a fact as adjudicative or legislative will often be a straightforward exercise.
On occasion, however, determining whether a particular constitutional fact is adjudicative
in character will not be obvious. Another component of the Millertest illustrates this very point.
The third prong of the test requires, for a finding of obscenity, that “the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”64 Although this fact is to be
determined in individual cases for specific materials in dispute, the question involves matters that
transcend particular cases. Whether Nabokov’s Lolita, for instance, has serious literary or artistic
value is a fact of general import, and is not readily classified into either the review-fact or
adjudicative-fact bins. In the end, the decision whether to label a particular fact as adjudicative
or otherwise may depend on what procedural path the court wants the fact to walk.65
constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively.”). At the same time, however,
because I prescribe very different rules of procedure for the different kinds of constitutional facts,
any ambiguity over what kind of facts are at stake will increase the uncertainty endemic to the
process.
62

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).

63

376 U.S. 254 (1964).

64

Miller, 413 U.S. at 15.
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This is the lesson that Professors Ronald Allen and Michael Pardo draw – and
advocate – in their excellent article on the law-fact distinction. Ronald J. Allen & Michael S.
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The very act of classifying a fact as a rule-, review-, or adjudicative-fact is an interpretive
exercise. A good example of the freedom inherent in classifying constitutional facts, and the
policy ramifications that follow from such classifications, comes from the Court’s standard for
reviewing the constitutionality of abortion regulations. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,66 the Court ruled that regulations that impose an undue burden on the
exercise of the right to a pre-viability abortion are unconstitutional. The undue burden standard
was operationally defined to include any regulation that created a “substantial obstacle” to the
exercise of the right.67 In Casey, the Court invalidated the spousal notification provision of the
disputed law applying this rule. The opinion for the Court, written jointly by Justices O’Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter, treated the issue as a review-fact, finding that research indicated that
domestic violence might occur in a small percentage of cases as a result of this notification
requirement. There was no suggestion that the claimants before the Court had experienced, or
were in danger of suffering, violence due to the spousal notification requirement. Yet the
prospect of such violence in the class of possible complainants, even if it constituted only a small
percentage of cases, was enough to invalidate the law in all cases.68

At the same time, the Casey Court upheld the 24-hour waiting provision, finding the
proof inadequate to conclude that such requirements unduly burden the right. But does this issue
implicate a review-fact or an adjudicative-fact and, if the former, was the appropriate domain the
nation or the state? In a Woman’s Choice-East Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman,69 the Seventh
Circuit offered a confusing, if not confused, answer to this question. The district court had
enjoined Indiana’s informed consent law shortly after it was enacted on the basis that it would
Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769 (2003).
66

505 U.S. 833 (1992).

67

Id. at 846.

68

Id. at 892, 894-95.

69

305 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2002).
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constitute an undue burden.70 Under the Indiana law, women had to wait at least 24-hours after
receiving information regarding the risks of the abortion procedure, thus necessitating two visits
to the abortion provider. The lower court enjoined this provision on the basis of empirical
studies conducted in Mississippi and Utah that indicated that the higher costs it imposed would
reduce the number of abortions performed in those states by 10% to 13% .71 Yet, as pointed out
by the Seventh Circuit, no research was available regarding the effect that the present
requirement would have in Indiana and the researchers had not compared the experience of
Mississippi and Utah to Indiana.72 At the same time, however, depending on how the legal
question was defined, the research might not have to apply specifically to Indiana at all for the
Indiana law to be invalidated on the basis of that research. In other cases, the Court had
employed a national scope for determining when abortion regulations constituted undue burdens.
In Casey itself, as noted above, the Court struck down the spousal notification provision based on
general research and did not inquire regarding state-wide experience under the challenged
Pennsylvania law. Similarly, in Stenberg v. Carhart,73 the Court used a national lens to view the
pertinent facts when it invalidated a Nebraska law that prohibited the use of “intact dilation and
extraction,” or what critics have dubbed “partial-birth abortion.”74 In subsequent litigation over
this issue, in particular involving congressional legislation on the subject, courts have routinely
considered the relevant level of analysis to be at the review-fact stage.75

70

A Woman’s Choice East Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 132 F.Supp.2d 1150,
1151 (S.D.Ind. 2001).
71

Id. at 1173.
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305 F.3d at 689.
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530 U.S. 914 (2000).
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Id. at 921.
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See Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 884 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J.,
dissenting) (“The health effects of partial birth abortion should indeed be treated as a legislative
fact, rather than an adjudicative fact, in order to avoid inconsistent results arising from the
reactions of different district judges…to different records.”), vacated 530 U.S. 1271 (2000).
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In cases like Casey and Stenberg, the national approach served the strong jurisprudential
value of ensuring consistent constitutional outcomes from state to state.76 The Newman court
explained the Supreme Court’s logic:
[C]onstitutionality must be assessed at the level of legislative fact, rather than
adjudicative fact determined by more than 650 district judges. Only treating the matter as
one of legislative fact produces the nationally uniform approach that Stenberg demands.77
The Seventh Circuit, however, after setting forth this sound explication of why the Court
framed the relevant facts under the undue burden test as national legislative facts, devoted the
lion’s share of its opinion to evaluating the applicability of the research to the operation of the
challenged provision in Indiana. The court observed that, “because the undue-burden approach
does not prescribe a choice between the legislative-fact and adjudicative-fact approaches, we
think it appropriate to review the evidence in this record and the inferences that properly may be
drawn at the pre-enforcement stage.”78 Based on this analysis – what essentially constituted a
state level review-fact analysis – the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling:
Indiana is entitled to an opportunity to have its law evaluated in light of experience in
Indiana.... [I]t is an abuse of discretion for a district judge to issue a pre-enforcement
injunction while the effects of the law (and reasons for those effects) are open to debate.
What happened in Mississippi and Utah does not imply that the effects in Indiana are
bound to be unconstitutional, so Indiana ... is entitled to put its law into effect and have
that law judged by its own consequences.79
The logic of the Seventh Circuit’s Newman decision is not obvious. If, indeed, Stenberg
specifically, and this area of the law more generally, “demands” the application of a “uniform
approach,” then the “experience in Indiana” is not particularly relevant to the ultimate
determination. It may be that the Mississippi and Utah studies were not sufficiently valid or
persuasive to conclude that, on a national scale, informed consent provisions like Indiana’s
76

Newman, 305 F.3d at 688.
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Id.
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Newman, 305 F.3d at 688-89.
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Id. at 693 (emphasis in original).
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unduly burden the abortion right. But that is a very different determination than saying that the
research does not apply in Indiana. Indiana’s particular experience is largely irrelevant under
Casey’s and Stenberg’s apparent interpretation of the relevant level of factual inquiry.

As already emphasized, the issue of what level of factual inquiry – i.e., adjudicative-,
review-, or rule-fact – should be employed in a particular constitutional context is an interpretive
matter. Both Casey and Stenberg appear to treat the applicable inquiry under the undue burden
standard as a nationally-defined review-fact. It is possible, however, to distinguish the 24-hour
waiting provision from the Casey and Stenberg subjects of spousal notification and late-term
abortion. Whereas the Casey and Stenberg subjects do not vary from place to place, a 24-hour
waiting provision might be more or less burdensome depending on the state in which it operates.
Waiting 24 hours might be a very substantial obstacle in Oklahoma or Utah, but not particularly
burdensome in Rhode Island or Delaware, because of the respective distances some women
might have to travel to obtain abortion services. Regardless, whatever the judgment regarding
the level of fact that is relevant under a particular constitutional provision, it should be an explicit
part of the constitutional analysis.

Although sorting constitutional facts into their respective categories appears to be
somewhat haphazard, certain conclusions can be offered in regard to this process. First of all, the
distinction between adjudicative-facts and review- and rule-facts in constitutional cases is clear
in theory, if not always in practice. Adjudicative-facts pertain to specific cases and have little or
no precedential force, while review- and rule-facts are general in nature and usually have import
as a matter of precedent. These general facts will sometimes be relevant to the definition of the
constitutional rule itself (i.e., constitutional rule-facts) or, more often, will be relevant when some
rule is applied to a set of general facts (i.e., constitutional review-facts). Second, the decision
whether the relevant fact under a particular constitutional rule falls into one category or another
is an interpretive judgment; and it is a judgment that should always be made explicitly. Under
Casey’s undue burden standard, as discussed above, the determination whether a 24-hour waiting
provision constitutes a “substantial obstacle” could be an adjudicative-fact or a review-fact.
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Indeed, at the review-fact level, the pertinent scope for fact-finding could be national, state-wide,
or the respective court’s jurisdiction. What measure of fact-finding is ultimately deemed
appropriate must depend on the constitutional values at stake. Very different procedural
consequences follow depending on the level of fact that courts find to be relevant. These
procedural consequences inevitably affect the substantive expression of constitutional rights.
Finally, the choice made regarding what kinds of facts are relevant under a particular
constitutional provision will determine the sorts of proof that might be used to find those facts.
The type of evidence used to prove adjudicative-facts usually differs markedly from the type of
evidence used to prove review-facts and, moreover, the identity of the respective finder of fact
changes as well. The next section takes up the matter of how different kinds of constitutional
facts might be proven.

C. Proving Constitutional Facts
Two basic issues are presented by the question of how constitutional facts are to be
proven. The first concerns what sort of proof is allowable, or, to use an evidentiary term,
“admissible,” to demonstrate that the fact is so or is not so. Terminology from evidence doctrine,
however, is misleading, since so much proof of constitutional facts comes to the knowledge of
courts outside of the trial process in which rules of evidence preside. The second basic issue
involves what decision-rules courts use to resolve conflicting evidence. Again, decision-rules,
such as burdens of production and standards of proof, are readily found in ordinary trial
procedure, but the highly varied ways in which constitutional facts are employed by courts makes
the analogy inexact. Constitutional facts present novel challenges to the traditional procedural
framework, since they sometimes fit it, sometimes do not, and sometimes fit it and do not fit it at
the same time. In many cases, for instance, the same constitutional fact will be the subject of
proof admitted at trial and proof introduced in an amicus brief. Evaluation criteria in
constitutional cases, therefore, might parallel those employed in evidence codes, but they also
must be applicable more generally to the factual determinations endemic to the Constitution. In
addition, although allocating burdens of proof is inherent to all fact-finding, the Court has
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historically viewed facts categorically in its constitutional analysis, as either true or not true, a
perspective wholly at odds with modern views of empiricism. This section considers both the
question of evidentiary standards and standards of proof. Once again, the division of facts into
the categories of rule-, review-, and adjudicative-facts assists in the resolution of these issues.

Yet, before moving on to examine the sources and burdens of proof for the different types
of constitutional facts, two issues bear emphasis here, since they apply to the establishment of all
three types of constitutional facts. The first, mentioned in the previous sections, is that what
sorts of facts are relevant in particular constitutional contexts is a matter of constitutional
interpretation. Constitutional values must be used to determine whether undue burdens are
measured nationally, on a case-by-case basis, or somewhere in-between, whether claims of
discrimination under the Eighth Amendment must be specific to the case or can be systemic, or
whether the effects of segregation are to be measured nationally or school-by-school. The second
issue is related to this proposition, in that once the sort of fact having constitutional relevance has
been established, courts must also determine, as a constitutional matter, the kinds of proof that
might be adequate to prove or disprove the fact. In social scientific terms, this issue concerns
what is referred to as the “operational definition” of the concept having constitutional relevance.
Legal notions such as competence, intelligence, and cruel and unusual, must be defined
concretely so that they can be measured for adjudicatory purposes.80 The issue of what must be
proven in order to meet the constitutional inquiry is a subject of law and a function of
constitutional interpretation.
80

Operational definitions permit the inter-subjective testing of hypotheses, in that
they give different researchers (or judges) a concrete idea what abstract concepts mean. A study
on jury deliberations, for example, might consider a host of outcome variables, operationally
defined as, say, verdicts (measured by jury awards in dollars), length of time of deliberations
(measured in minutes), juror satisfaction (measured by juror responses to a questionnaire), and so
on. The basic idea of an operational definition is endemic to all science. For example,
meteorologists might measure temperature by use of a thermometer or by “wind-chill.” Windchill combines thermometer readings with wind speed and takes into account physiological
factors, such as heat loss from the body (i.e., modern heat transfer theory). For an excellent
discussion of wind chill, including conversion charts, see
http://www.weather.gov/om/windchill/index.shtml.
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In Atkins v. Virginia, for example, the Court held that executions of mentally retarded
criminals constituted cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
Although the Court did not specifically define what qualifies as valid proof of mental retardation,
it is clear that this will be a central point of contention in subsequent cases.81 The question of
whether an individual capital defendant is mentally retarded for purposes of an Atkinsanalysis –
and thereby categorically excluded from the death penalty – is a constitutional fact. But how
mental retardation is to be operationally defined must be resolved as a matter of law. This will
prove to be difficult, however, since the issue of where to draw a categorical line on I.Q. that
distinguishes low intelligence from retardation is not a straightforward exercise. Ideally, the line
between an un-executable mentally-retarded criminal and an executable low-intelligence criminal
should be drawn on the basis of the reasons the AtkinsCourt gave for holding that it was cruel
and unusual to execute mentally retarded murderers in the first place. According to Justice
Stevens’ opinion, these reasons include, among others, that the twin purposes of deterrence and
retribution do not apply to the mentally deficient in the same way that they apply to those without
similar intellectual deficiencies. Unfortunately, research provides little guidance on just how
mentally deficient a person would have to be for deterrence and retribution not to apply to him or
her.82

The question, therefore, of how the category of “mental retardation” is to be operationally
defined for Atkinspurposes is a constitutional rule, with all of the ambiguity and normative
considerations that attend these sorts of determinations.83 Rule-facts are likely to be relevant to
81

See, e.g., In re Bowling, 422 F.3d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Atkins did not set
forth a definitive rule or procedure for the courts to follow in determining when an offender is
mentally retarded such that his or her execution would violate the Eighth Amendment. Instead,
Atkins reserved for the states “the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the
constitutional restriction” upon the execution of sentences.”) (quoting Roper, 536 U.S. at 317)).
82

See Atkins, 536 U.S. 304, 350 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]hat scientific analysis
can possibly show that a mildly retarded individual who commits an exquisite torture-killing is
‘no more culpable’ than the ‘average’ murder in a hold-up-gone-wrong or a domestic dispute?”).
83

See infra Section II.1.a.
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the delineation of this category and together with normative considerations can contribute to the
construction of a practicable framework. Once this category is defined, however, proof regarding
whether a particular capital defendant is “mentally retarded” is a constitutional adjudicative-fact.

A parallel process must occur with constitutional review-facts, as evidenced by Roper v.
Simmons. Following fast upon Atkins, the Roper Court held that executing criminals who
committed their crimes when they were sixteen or seventeen was unconstitutional. Roper relied
on a similar form of analysis to Atkins, in that the Court found that minors were less responsible
for their actions and less likely to be deterred by the death penalty than adults. Rather than
require individual competency assessments, as was essentially the case in Atkins, the Court held
that the rule applied to all minors, even though some might have reasoning capacities equal to
those of adults. In reaching its conclusion that executing those who committed their crimes as
minors was unconstitutional, the Court cited three factual conclusions that supported the
decision: surveys of American attitudes toward executing minors, the psychological and
physiological developmental differences between minors and adults, and surveys of international
practices on the subject. Each of these grounds raises constitutional review-facts, the proof of
which is discussed in this section. But the kinds of proof that are adequate to prove these facts is
an issue that must be determined as a matter of law. For instance, under the Eighth Amendment,
the Court has repeatedly stated that Americans’ attitudes toward the death penalty is a relevant
consideration. The Court, however, operationally defines this factual issue as a matter of state
legislative practice, as opposed to, say, popular surveys of voters or Americans more generally.84
Thus, that contemporary views of the death penalty are relevant and that these views are
measured largely by virtue of state legislative practice, are legal considerations determined
according to the Court’s understanding of the Constitution’s meaning. Once determined to be
constitutionally relevant, surveys of state constitutional practice (or international practices, or the
developmental capacities of minors) become constitutional review-facts that must be found
84
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according to particular rules of procedure. This section examines the procedures that might be
appropriate for finding constitutional facts, depending on the sort of fact that has been accorded
constitutional significance.

1. Proving Constitutional Rule-Facts
Rule-facts are typically the grandest and most amorphous facts found in constitutional
cases. The two most common are historical facts associated with original intent and sociological
facts associated with structural issues surrounding the operation of the Constitution. Both kinds
are replete with uncertainty, much of it associated with the difficulty of studying these respective
subjects. Evidentiary standards and decision-rules must be responsive to the nature of the proof
available. This means that traditional notions surrounding evidence and standards of proof are
largely inapposite in the case of constitutional rule-facts. Rule-facts tend to be as much a product
of aspiration as they are deduced from evidence.

a. Sources of Proof
Rule-facts are a component of the interpretive process of determining the meaning of
specific provisions of the Constitution. They are thus part of the law making process. As a
consequence, rule-facts are only tangentially a function of the adversarial process. Although the
parties are charged with the responsibility to inform courts about the applicable law, including
the authorities that support that law, courts independently determine the law’s content. Courts
are not restricted to the parties’ views on the Constitution’s meaning, nor are they bound to the
authorities presented by the parties for determining that meaning. Just as a judge might retire to
the library to research a line of cases, he or she might consult “The Federalist” when considering
what foundational principles underlie the Supremacy Clause.

Rule-facts, therefore, generally do not come to courts’ attention through expert witnesses
or testimony at trial. On occasion, perhaps, a trial court might request testimony on a fact that is
relevant to the definition of a rule, but this is likely to be relatively rare. More often, factually-31-

based supporting arguments for original intent or constitutional structure will be presented in
briefs or memoranda based on independent research published in articles or books. As noted,
judges might also independently consult these sources in an effort to frame or shape doctrine.
Indeed, a goodly amount of a judge’s extra-judicial reading might involve histories that could
influence his or her perspectives on constitutional law. A judge who reads a biography of
Alexander Hamilton or a history of the New Deal Court might very well apply this new found
knowledge to his or her constitutional cases.

As a practical matter, rule-facts are complexly intertwined with logical and normative
arguments. It will often be hard to say where the empirical argument ends and the normative
argument begins. For example, in New York Times v. Sullivan,85 the Court adopted the “actual
malice” standard for libel actions brought by public officials against critics of their official
actions. When applied, this rule requires proof by adjudicative facts, since actual malice requires
a showing “that the statement was made with ... knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.”86 But the New York Times rule is, itself, based on a
combination of normative propositions and factual predicates.

Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in New York Times, relied on both historical facts
and sociological facts to support the new defamation standard. He argued, for example, that the
libel standard applied by the lower court was similar to the Sedition Act of 1798, a law
invalidated “in the court of history” due to the restraints it “imposed upon criticism of
government and public officials.”87 Additionally, Brennan asserted, because “erroneous
statement is inevitable in free debate,” even false statements must “be protected if the freedoms
of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need ... to survive.’”88 Brennan stated
85
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that the Alabama rule could not be “saved by its allowance of the defense of truth.” This rule, he
observed, leads to “self-censorship.” “[W]ould-be critics of official conduct may be deterred
from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact
true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do
so.”89 The Alabama libel rule, the Court concluded, “dampens the vigor and limits the variety of
public debate.”90 The Free Speech Clause, then, assumes its meaning in part from the historical
lessons surrounding attempts to suppress expression and the effects of particular rules on human
behavior.

There are two particularly noteworthy aspects of constitutional rule-facts, as illustrated by
Justice Brennan’s opinion in New York Times. The first is, as noted, the seamless character of
the argument between, on the one hand, statements regarding the normative values inherent in
the First Amendment – free discourse, debate and dissent – and, on the other hand, the factual
arguments regarding the history of the Sedition Act or Brennan’s account of the psychology of
civil libel law and its potential to chill speech. In terms of evaluating which premises are doing
the work, one premise cannot be disentangled easily from the others. As is often true in this
context, the factual arguments in New York Times are interwoven into the textual and normative
ones.

Another characteristic of rule-facts evidenced in New York Times is the virtual total lack
of supporting authorities for these assertions. Because of their generally abstract and highly
complex nature, judges generally feel less compulsion to cite supporting authorities for rule-facts
than they do for the other kinds of constitutional facts. Historical facts, particularly those with
constitutional relevance, often seem to assume mythical qualities. Many become part of the lore
of constitutional doctrine, much as George Washington’s cherry tree is an abiding fiction taught
to generations of school children. Arguments for a strong reading of the Second Amendment, for
example, seem to have as much to do with late twentieth-century Hollywood as late eighteenth89
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century Philadelphia.91

b. Allocating Burdens of Proof
Factual claims surrounding “original intent” occupy the largest niche of constitutional
rule-facts. But the task of reliably identifying original intent is beset by several basic challenges,
some associated with the strain of stating the constitutionally relevant inquiry and others
concerned with the difficulty of fact-investigation in historical analysis. As regards the former,
courts and commentators have never adequately defined the specific issue in original intent that
is the source of constitutional meaning.92 Indeed, even the question of the initial relevance of
original intent has been challenged.93 But assuming its relevance, what inquiry is constitutionally
mandated? Is it the drafters’ intent?, the ratifiers’ intent?, and what degree of agreement among
the possible “intenders” is necessary to determine a specific intent?94 Complicating matters
substantially is the latter challenge, that history as a discipline is rarely able to provide definitive
proof and is very susceptible to the biases of the age in which it is done. Although historians
have many powerful methodological tools, the picture they provide usually offers little more than
a dim perception of a world shrouded in the mists of time.

Similarly, sociological or political science explorations into the structural operation of the
Constitution are assailed by the complexity of the subject. Consider, for example, one of the
perennial structural issues presented by the American Constitution, the question whether small
republics (i.e., the states) are more likely to be protective of liberty than large republics (i.e., the
91
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national government).95 This debate divided Jefferson and Madison in 1787, the Nation in 1861,
and continues to this day to affect both constitutional doctrine and popular debate. Debates over
states’ rights have for some time failed to seriously evaluate Montesquieu’s assertion that “[i]t is
natural to a republic to have only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist.”96 Alexander
Hamilton deftly refuted Montesquieu’s relevance to the constitutional debate, observing, “[w]hen
Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the standards he had in view were of
dimensions far short of the limits of almost every one of these States.”97 Yet, to this day, and
based on neither reason nor experience, the perspective associated with Montesquieu remains a
core stricture of constitutional faith. Presumably, there is a fact of the matter, but it is likely one
that is highly complex and contextual, and the tools of social science are unlikely ever to give us
a definitive answer. Instead, the facts are known sufficiently enough only to give the opposing
sides enough ammunition to sustain an argument. The choice between traditional Federalist
beliefs in the virtues of a large republic and traditional Anti-Federalist beliefs in States’ rights
largely depends on differing policy agendas rather than disagreements over natural philosophy or
political science.

For the most part, the sorts of facts that underlie constitutional rules are as much articles
of faith as they are matters of scientific investigation. The concept of burdens of proof do not
readily apply to such fact-finding, since there is little, if any, quantitative quality to their
discovery. The most that can be said is that these facts are known with more or less confidence,
but the ranges of such confidence are likely to be fairly wide. Moreover, as noted above, rulefacts are typically used in conjunction with other authorities, such as textual interpretation and
95
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precedent, and thus rarely have independent significance for the definition of particular doctrine.
It would make little more sense to apply burdens of proof to historical facts than it would to
apply such decision-rules to the holdings of precedent. Defining the Constitution is, at bottom, a
rhetorical exercise, and although facts are often employed in the process, rule-facts are a
constituent part of the process of setting the Constitution’s meaning and cannot be well
understood or effectively evaluated outside of the interpretive enterprise.

2. Proving Constitutional Review-Facts
Review-facts become relevant under constitutionally-based rules or standards. They
share qualities of both rule-facts and adjudicative-facts. Like the former, they transcend
individual cases and, once found, have precedential effect. Like the latter, however, they
typically can be operationally defined98 and subject to substantial, if not definitive, proof. Unlike
rule-facts, review-facts can be taken seriously in constitutional adjudication because they are
defined largely independently of normative considerations. With review-facts, there is more
likely to be a fact-of-the-matter that can be studied by multiple researchers, whose terms can be
operationally defined, and which is amenable to refutation. Given their complexity, the role of
evidentiary standards and standards of proof are especially important when review-facts are in
dispute.

a. Sources of Proof
Courts become aware of review-facts in a myriad of ways. Proof of review-facts is
introduced through expert testimony, in the briefs and memoranda of the parties and amici, and
through independent judicial research. Immediately apparent, given the wide variety of
pathways, is the range of standards that might be employed in the reception of proof of these
facts. At trial, evidence regarding review-facts must overcome the fairly substantial threshold
provided by rules of admissibility, typically those involving expert testimony. On appeal, in
98
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contrast, courts routinely accept amicus briefs chock-full of factual assertions from interested
parties who might, or might not, have expertise on the subject. Relatedly, constitutional reviewfacts are introduced at every level of court. Historically, there has been no practice or tradition
that review-facts be introduced at trial and survive the rigors of the adversarial process. Indeed,
the celebrated Brandeis Brief is an example of the extra-evidentiary admission of constitutional
review-facts. In Muller v. Oregon,99 the sociological arguments Brandeis used to justify the
Oregon law were presented first on appeal. A certain degree of confusion, therefore, reigns in
constitutional cases when it comes to proof of review-facts.

Despite the somewhat chaotic situation surrounding review-facts, the state of affairs is
nothing like the free-for-all that occurs with rule-facts. Moreover, review-facts merit more
serious and systematic attention than do rule-facts. Rule-facts tend to be amorphous and abstract,
and rarely do the heavy lifting in constitutional interpretation. Review-facts, in contrast, are
more concrete, more likely to be amenable to rigorous empirical research, and more often taken
seriously in constitutional adjudication. Constitutional cases are replete with review facts. In
Barnes v. Glen Theatre100 and City of Erie v. Pap’s AM,101 the Court accepted the proposition
that nude dancing establishments lead to increased crime, including prostitution, drug abuse, and
assaults. Explicitly in Barefoot v. Estelle102 and United States v. Salerno,103 and implicitly in
Kansas v. Hendricks104 and Kansas v. Crane,105 the Court rejected the proposition that
psychiatrists and psychologists are unable to adequately predict whether a person will be violent
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in the future. In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,106 the Court refused to invalidate a
congressional statute regulating virtual child pornography because of the lack of empirical
evidence that these materials caused substantial societal harms.107 And the list of such cases
involving review-facts goes on almost without end. Given their abundance, one might have
thought that some procedural guidelines or evaluative guideposts would apply to proof of
constitutional review-facts. As of yet, however, there are none.

Less so than rule-facts, and more so than adjudicative-facts, review-facts implicate basic
constitutional values and effectively establish constitutional boundaries. In Grutter v.
Bollinger,108 for example, the Court said that the strict scrutiny test applied to the affirmative
action program adopted by the University of Michigan’s School of Law. This test provides “that
[racial] classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling
governmental interests.”109 Under this test, courts review both the means and the ends of
programs classifying by race, and both involve inquiries regarding constitutional facts. The
Court, therefore, ostensibly analyzed whether Michigan’s objective was sufficiently compelling
and whether the means chosen to effectuate that objective were narrowly tailored.

The compelling government interest, the Court stated, was the single justification of
“obtaining ‘the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body.’”110 Although the
Court deferred to the school’s “educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its
educational mission,”111 it summarized the basis for the factual conclusion that educational
106
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benefits flow from a diverse student body. The district court, for instance, found that “‘crossracial understanding’ helps to break down racial stereotypes, and ‘enables [students] to better
understand persons of different races.’”112 The benefits of diversity mean that “‘classroom
discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting” when the
students have ‘the greatest possible variety of backgrounds.’”113 The Court insisted that the
educational benefits of diversity “are not theoretical but real.”114 The Court supported this
assertion by observing that, “[i]n addition to the expert studies and reports entered into evidence
at trial, numerous studies show that student body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and
‘better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares
them as professionals.’”115 The Court cited an assortment of amicus briefs and scholarly books to
buttress this conclusion.116

The GrutterCourt relied on a variety of authorities to support its finding that Michigan
reasonably believed that racial diversity promoted educational benefits.117 In Grutter, these
authorities were introduced through evidence adduced at trial, amicus briefs, and scholarly
materials. Presumably, however, while the expert evidence introduced at trial survived some
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threshold assessment of validity, the other sources of data, so far as the opinion indicates,
received no similar kind of threshold evaluation. The question naturally arises, therefore,
whether evidence of constitutional review-facts should be assessed for validity and, if so, by what
standards this should be done.

In federal courts, expert evidence is preliminarily assessed under Rule 702 and the
Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.118 Daubert held that trial
courts are gatekeepers and must be persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that the basis
for expert opinion is reliable and valid before it can be admitted. As a procedural matter,
however, it would be impractical to apply Daubert to proof of constitutional review-facts.
Despite some justices’ lament that constitutional facts should undergo the scrutiny of the
adversarial process,119 this is an unrealistic and unhelpful perspective. First of all, because
constitutional review-facts transcend any single litigation, and thus have precedential import, the
development of a factual record cannot be left to the parties. An attorney’s failure to adequately
develop the factual record in an ordinary dispute only affects his or her client’s matter. Such a
failure in constitutional litigation potentially affects a multitude of cases. The Court cannot be
limited to the record before it when determining constitutional review-facts. If amici were not
readily available to supply evidence regarding review-facts, the Court would be obligated to
conduct its own independent research. In this sense, questions regarding review-facts bear some
resemblance to questions surrounding the correct legal standard. Just as no court would defer to
the parties to say what the law is, no court should rely on the parties exclusively to say what the
review-facts are.
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Although Daubert as a rule of evidence does not ordinarily apply to proof of
constitutional review-facts, the core principles of that decision can offer some guidance to
assessing the methodological bases of such proof. In short, Daubert stands for the proposition
that the probative value of expert evidence is proportionate to the quality and quantity of the data
that support it. In the case of scientific evidence, for instance, Daubert held that expert opinions
based on research that was inadequately tested, that had high or unknown error rates, that had not
been subjected to peer review or been published, and that had failed to gain general acceptance in
its particular field, was likely to have little validity and thus low evidentiary reliability. But the
core principle of Daubert extends to all fact-based experts, not just scientists. Under Daubert
and subsequent cases, all experts must show that their opinions are based on “good grounds.”120
The mere assertion of “years of experience,” or what the Court has referred to as the “ipse dixit”
of the expert,121 is not alone sufficient to verify expert opinion.

Daubert largely incorporates the critical perspective associated with the methods of
scientific investigation. This approach should inform judicial reception of evidence regarding
constitutional review-facts. Judges should measure empirical claims in accordance with the
methods on which these claims are based. Invariably, knowledge about the empirical world will
be known with greater or lesser confidence. And the more complex the phenomenon, the more
difficult it will be to study. Indeed, often, if not more often than not, the complex phenomena
relevant in constitutional cases will be largely beyond the methodological abilities of scientists.
When this is so, the normative principles of the Constitution must be consulted in order to
allocate the risk of error. In short, the Constitution establishes rules of decision for fact-based
inquiries. For example, the constitutionality of a law prohibiting virtual child pornography
depends, in part, on the factual question of whether such materials contribute to violence against
children, a subject on which there is little evidence. In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,122 the
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Court invalidated the statute proscribing virtual child pornography on the basis that the
government had failed to adduce evidence supporting its empirical claims.123 If the government
had produced such evidence, it should have been evaluated under a Daubert-like inquiry. Such
inquiries must be guided by burdens of proof that correspond to the constitutional values at stake.
As was true in Free Speech Coalition, if no evidence is forthcoming, the party that bears the
burden of proof loses.

b. Allocating Burdens of Proof
The basic problem inherent in the court’s current approach to finding constitutional
review-facts is itsad hoc nature. Although, as noted, the Court oftentimes speaks in terms of
“rational basis review” and “strict scrutiny,” it virtually never specifies what burdens of proof
apply to the fact-finding that must occur under these standards. Constitutional-review facts and
constitutional-adjudicative facts, by definition, are relevant under particular constitutional rules.
Part of the explication of any constitutional rule should include a statement of which party – the
challenger or the State – has the burden of proof and at what level of proof that burden must be
met.

Given the enormity of the task and the limited space available here, I can only introduce
the idea of incorporating evidentiary burdens of proof into constitutional adjudication.124 But the
core insight is clear and should be relatively easily implemented. Consider, for example, the
Court’s “undue burden” standard, discussed above, which was first set forth in its modern form
by a plurality of the Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey125 and later applied by a majority in
Stenberg v. Carhart. Casey described the undue burden test as follows:
Numerous forms of state regulation might have the incidental effect of increasing the cost
or decreasing the availability of medical care, whether for abortion or any other medical
123
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procedure. The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at
the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to
procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it. Only where state regulation
imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make this decision does the power of
the state reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.126
According to the opinion jointly authored by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, “[a]
finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of
a nonviable fetus.”127 The undue burden test as formulated, and as applied by the joint opinion in
Casey, is primarily fact-based. In effect, the undue burden test strikes a balance between
individual liberty and government interests in the definition of the rule, but fails to explain how
that rule should be applied in concrete cases.

Two provisions of the Pennsylvania law illustrate the confusion surrounding the
application of the undue burden test. The Pennsylvania law, among other things, imposed a 24hour waiting period and contained a spousal notification provision.128 The joint opinion upheld
the former and invalidated the latter. Yet, it appears that substantial proof existed indicating that
the two provisions were burdensome, thus casting doubt on the constitutionality of both of them.
Indeed, the district court found that the 24-hour waiting provision “increas[ed] the cost and risk
of abortions”129 and was “particularly burdensome,”130 and, additionally, found that spousal
notification would significantly burden the basic right of reproductive choice among some
women.
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The joint opinion in Casey concluded that the spousal notification provision was unduly
burdensome but that the evidence did not support a similar conclusion regarding the 24-hour
waiting requirement. But the opinion failed to explain its reasons for believing that one
provision was unduly burdensome while the other was not. As regards the 24-hour waiting
provision, the joint opinion simply stated, “on the record before us, ... we are not convinced that
the 24-hour waiting period constitutes an undue burden.”131 In contrast, the joint opinion
adopted the factual findings of the district court in striking down the spousal notification
provision. Indeed, the joint opinion went beyond the findings of the district court and cited
research studies that were not in the record.132 The joint opinion concluded that “[t]he spousal
notification requirement ... does not merely make abortions a little more difficult or expensive to
obtain; for many women, it will impose a substantial obstacle.”133

A large part of the ambiguity associated with constitutional adjudication stems from the
Court’s refusal to recognize the empirical component of constitutional review-facts and its failure
to allocate responsibility for demonstrating review-facts having constitutional import. Under the
Commerce Clause, for instance, the Court has long insisted that Congress need not demonstrate
that a challenged regulation “substantially affects interstate commerce,” though it has suggested
that such proof might be of assistance to the Court’s determination.134 Recent cases, however,
indicate a large measure of ambiguity over whether Congress bears any burden of proof in these
cases, or, if so, what the nature of that burden is. In United States v. Lopez,135 the Court stated
131
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that it agreed “that Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to the
substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce.”136 The Court failed to say what
circumstances might not qualify as “normal.” Moreover, the Court stated cryptically that, “to the
extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the
activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no substantial effect
was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking [here].”137 Justice Breyer, in dissent, offered a
factual basis for Congress’ judgment that guns in school zones substantially affect interstate
commerce. It is unclear, however, whether if Congress had forwarded the justification identified
by Breyer it would have made any difference. More to the point, it is unclear what standard of
proof applies in Commerce Clause cases after Lopez.138

3. Proving Constitutional Adjudicative-Facts
Adjudicative facts are, in many respects, the most anomalous sort of facts in
constitutional cases. On the one hand, they are seemingly the most manageable kinds of facts.
They are readily recognized, since they are case-specific, and ostensibly are subject to all of the
ordinary rules of procedure and evidence. Also, because they are case-specific, they do not
appear to have many precedential consequences. On the other hand, they can be difficult to
manage and can, in fact, be complex and extraordinary. Most difficult is the initial question
whether the relevant inquiry should be at the adjudicative-fact or legislative-fact level (whether
review- or rule-fact). For example, in New York v. Ferber,139 the Court held that the deleterious
136
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consequences that were suffered by children who appeared in child pornography were sufficient
to justify the proscription of this entire class of speech. Although not described in such terms,
the physical and psychological consequences of child pornography for the children involved in it
were treated as constitutional review-facts in Ferber. The Ferber Court cited “the legislative
judgment that the use of children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the
physiological, emotional, and mental health of the [child].”140 In contrast, and in dissent, Justice
Brennan argued that the appropriate level of analysis should be case-specific, for allowing
prohibitions of all child pornography swept too broadly and affected materials having scientific,
literary, or artistic value. Justice Brennan preferred the use of a Miller- styled test, which would
have made the relevant constitutional fact adjudicative, as is the case for materials alleged to be
obscene.

Although constitutional adjudicative-facts have no formal effect as precedent, they are
nonetheless likely to reverberate throughout subsequent cases. They often establish
constitutional boundaries and effectively serve as “cases-in-point” for the limits or allowances of
constitutional doctrine. In addition, in the individual cases in which they are found, they
invariably affect constitutional rights and values. As a consequence of this greater constitutional
role, constitutional adjudicative-facts are generally understood as raising mixed questions of fact
and law and thus garner substantially more judicial attention than run-of-the-mill adjudicativefacts.141

a. Sources of Proof
Adjudicative-facts, because they are case-specific, normally are proven by the testimony
of lay or expert witnesses. There is little of significant controversy surrounding these facts, since
140
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generally Monaghan, supra note XX, at 238 (“We commonly assume that there is something
distinctive about judicial review of the adjudicative facts decisive of any constitutional claim.”).
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courts are usually content to allow ordinary rules of evidence and procedure to apply to them.
When disputed in court, rules of evidence apply to proffered testimony, writings, or other
materials. There are, however, at least two special situations that arise fairly commonly
concerning constitutional adjudicative-facts that merit some attention. First, rules of evidence
are sometimes challenged on the basis that they violate the Constitution. And second, the
Constitution might be interpreted to require certain kinds of proof, such as expert testimony over
that of lay testimony.

Like all statutes, rules of evidence must conform to constitutional guarantees. Evidence
codes apply to all adjudicative facts, so there is an Escher-like quality to factual challenges to the
constitutionality of a rule of evidence. Consider, for example, the cases of Rock v. Arkansas142
and United States v. Scheffer.143 These two cases raised similar Sixth Amendment issues, but
were resolved quite differently, both as a substantive matter and in regard to the Court’s
treatment of the constitutional facts implicated in the cases. In Scheffer, the defendant claimed
that the United States military’s per se rule excluding polygraph evidence violated his Sixth
Amendment right to present a defense.144 The defendant in Scheffer relied on Rock, in which the
Court had stated that rules of evidence “may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes
they are designed to serve.”145 Based on this admonition, the Rock Court invalidated the
Arkansas per se rule prohibiting the admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony. The Court
concluded that a “State’s legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence does not extend to per
se exclusions that may be reliable in an individual case.”146 The Scheffer Court, however, found
the per se rule excluding polygraphs not to be arbitrary, since it was designed to exclude
unreliable evidence. The Court found that “there is simply no consensus that polygraph evidence
142
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is reliable.”147 Indeed, the Court stated, “[t]o this day, the scientific community remains
extremely polarized about the reliability of polygraph techniques.”148 Therefore, the Court
apparently concluded that hypnotically refreshed recall was sufficiently reliable in enough cases
to preclude a per se rule, but polygraph evidence was not.149 In both cases, the Court evaluated
the disputed evidence as a constitutional review-fact, since the sometimes reliability of
hypnotically refreshed recall and the less dependable polygraph test were considered as a general
matter, given the state of the art of scientific research. In Rock, however, the Court’s resolution
created an adjudicative-fact inquiry. As the Rock Court made clear, although the per se rule was
unconstitutional, hypnotically refreshed recall could still be excluded on a case-by-case basis
when the refreshed testimony was unreliable.150

The Constitution also affects evidentiary practice when the Court determines whether a
particular provision requires a certain kind of proof. For example, in ordinary commitment
proceedings, the state must prove, among other things, that the defendant is mentally ill. In
Addington v. Texas,151 the Court observed that “[t]here may be factual issues to resolve in a
commitment proceeding, but the factual aspects represent only the beginning of the inquiry.”152
The Court added, “[w]hether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to himself or others and
is in need of confined therapy turns on the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by
expert psychiatrists and psychologists.”153 Although the Court has yet to specifically say, it
147
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would appear that the testimony of a mental health expert would be constitutionally necessary in
order to involuntarily commit someone under Addington. In capital sentencing, however, the
Court has expressly accepted lay persons’ ability to predict dangerousness,154 despite substantial
evidence that such predictions of violence are prone to error even when done by expert
psychiatrists and psychologists155

b. Allocating Burdens of Proof
A central orienting procedural mechanism for adjudicative facts is the standard of proof.
Burdens of proof apportion the costs of making mistakes to the parties based on the social and
policy consequences associated with one kind of mistake or another. As the Court explained in
Addington v. Texas,156 the “standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and
to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision.”157 The Addington Court
said that at one end of the spectrum are ordinary civil cases involving monetary disputes between
private parties. In these cases, “society has a minimal concern with the outcome, [so] the
plaintiffs’ burden of proof is a mere preponderance of the evidence.”158 At the other end of the
spectrum, in criminal cases, “the interests of the defendant are of such magnitude that historically
... they have been protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the
likelihood of an erroneous judgment.”159 According to the Court, “[t]his is accomplished by
requiring under the Due Process Clause that the state prove the guilt of an accused beyond a
154
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reasonable doubt.”160 Thus, “[i]n the administration of criminal justice, our society imposes
almost the entire risk of error upon itself.”161

In Addington, the Court considered what standard of proof applies when a state seeks to
involuntarily commit a person to a mental hospital for an indefinite period. The Court initially
observed that commitment hearings, which pose “a significant deprivation of liberty,” require a
standard greater than a preponderance of the evidence. At the same time, the Court found that
the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was not appropriate in ordinary civil
commitment cases. Instead, it held that an intermediate standard, a clear and convincing
evidence requirement, was best tailored to the costs of error in this area.162 The Court offered
several reasons for this conclusion. First, following an involuntary commitment, the continuing
involvement of professionals, family, and friends in the person’s treatment would provide
opportunities for errors to be corrected. Second, making an error that permits a mentally ill
person to live in the general community is not necessarily good for that person: “It cannot be said
... that it is much better for a mentally ill person to ‘go free’ than for a mentally normal person to
be committed.”163 And third, the Court observed, “[g]iven the lack of certainty and the fallibility
of psychiatric diagnoses, there is a serious question as to whether a state could ever prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that an individual is both mentally ill and likely to be violent.”164 The
Addington Court, therefore, explicitly weighed the costs and benefits associated with the risks of
erroneous commitments (i.e., false positives) and erroneous releases (i.e., false negatives), and
concluded that proof somewhat greater than preponderance but somewhat less than beyond a
reasonable doubt was constitutionally mandated. Whatever one thinks of Addington’s bottom
160
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line, the Court’s candidness and the clarity it produces for future cases should be applauded.

III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACT-FINDING

As demonstrated in the previous sections, facts are endemic to the entire enterprise of
constitutional decision making. Constitutional facts are found up, down, and across the
judiciary’s hierarchical structure. By far the most traditional understanding of constitutional facts
involves the bottom-up process whereby trial courts receive evidence regarding disputed facts
and this evidence becomes part of the record on appeal. This is only a small part of the overall
picture, however, since facts come into the legal process at many different points, including such
common avenues as the briefs of the parties and amici. Moreover, facts do not merely percolate
up through the judiciary, but they regularly trickle down from above. In particular, since
constitutional facts are intrinsic to both the rules themselves and their application to specific
cases, they become part of the doctrine that is set forth by higher courts. This section considers
the dynamics of constitutional fact-finding first from the bottom up and then from the top down.

A. Facts Found by Lower Courts
Constitutional facts are not merely the province of courts, but are regularly found by
decision makers across the entire apparatus of government. Police officers make judgments
about what constitutes suspicious behavior before making a stop, university administrators assess
the empirical benefits of diversity in establishing affirmative action programs, and state
legislatures considering legislation mandating the teaching of “intelligent design” might examine
the pedagogical benefits that come from teaching it together with the theory of evolution.
Virtually every decision having constitutional import is accompanied by findings of fact. Since
courts are the ultimate determiners of what the law is, they are obligated to review the factual
findings that either implicitly or explicitly support decisions that implicate constitutional values.
This raises the important question of how much deference a particular court owes to another
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institution’s or another court’s constitutional fact-finding. This question arises when courts
review the fact-finding of juries, legislatures and administrative agencies. It also arises when
appellate courts review lower court fact-finding as well as when lower courts apply higher court
precedents premised on those courts’ factual findings. In general, a particular court’s obligation
to defer to another body’s fact-finding depends on two things, first, the constitutional relationship
between the court and that body, and, second, the constitutional import of the particular finding.
In this section, I consider the judiciary’s constitutional obligations regarding both finding facts
and reviewing facts found elsewhere.165

1. Judicial Review of Constitutional Facts Found at Trial
At trial, constitutional facts are found by either the trial judge or jury. The jury’s
obligations under the Constitution are ordinarily limited to adjudicative facts, since rule- and
review-facts implicate broad policy matters that fall outside of the jury’s charge.166 But
constitutional adjudicative-facts also implicate policy matters, since their determination affects
the exercise of individual rights or the boundaries of constitutional doctrine. An adjudicative fact
determination of intentional discrimination or obscenity effectively establishes the content of the
respective constitutional provision. This suggests that courts should uniformly apply a stringent
standard of review for all constitutional facts found at the trial level, since they all implicate basic
constitutional rights or values. And this is uncontroversially the rule with regard to
165
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constitutional-rule and constitutional-review facts.167 This section, therefore, focuses on the
thornier issue of judicial review of constitutional adjudicative-facts found by juries.

2. Juries Within the Constitutional Structure
At least two propositions argue for greater deferential review of adjudicative facts found
by juries, and neither is ultimately persuasive in constitutional cases. The first involves the
special place held by juries in the constitutional framework. Since juries are creatures of the
Constitution itself, they should perhaps receive deference due to their peculiar role in
constitutional adjudication. The second proposition is applicable whether the constitutional
adjudicative-facts are found by judge or jury and is a shibboleth of evidence law: because
appellate courts lack the benefit of seeing witnesses first-hand and thus are unable to judge their
credibility, they should defer to trial court factual findings. Thus, for example, under New York
Times v. Sullivan, determining whether a false statement was made “with actual malice” is likely
to turn on credibility judgments that the trier of fact is uniquely situated to evaluate. In this
section, I consider these two issues and conclude that neither provides a convincing basis for
adopting a deferential standard of review for constitutional adjudicative-facts found at trial.

a. Juries and constitutional values
The Sixth and Seventh Amendments guarantee the right to a jury trial in criminal and
civil cases, respectively. In most civil and criminal litigation, the jury (or, if no jury, the judge)
ordinarily finds adjudicative facts. Procedural rules, including in particular state and federal
rules of evidence and procedure, apply to adjudicative fact-finding. Outside of constitutional
167
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cases, higher courts typically defer to the fact-finding from below, and this approach is codified
in federal practice.168 Given their constitutional status and this traditional appellate deference, it
might be assumed that juries would receive comparable respect in constitutional cases. But the
underlying rationale for the jury system and its historical purposes put it at odds with basic
constitutional principles. A jury’s primary role is to represent the community from which its
members are drawn. In constitutional cases, however, this role comes in conflict with the
Constitution’s protection of individual rights. As an essentially majoritarian institution, the
jury’s role clashes with the countermajoritarian values guaranteed by the Constitution.

The jury is generally thought, in theory if not in practice, to be a cross-section of the
community whose members bring their experience and commonsense to the application of the
law.169 Jurors are the neighbors and peers of the accused in criminal cases and the disputants in
civil cases. They bring the larger community’s perspective into the courtroom.170 Jurors
represent mainstream society. This grounding in the knowledge of the community permits jurors
to bring a practical realism to particular cases and to soften the law’s application if it proves too
rigid. The jury represents the public and while it may carry out this representation imperfectly,
its verdicts are usually accepted as legitimate largely on this basis.

Because of this identification with the public at-large, juries – and jurors – mostly are not
held accountable by the public for their decisions. Jurors melt back into the community when
168
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they have finished their service. If a verdict is condemned for some reason, it is the institution
that ordinarily bears responsibility. Public reaction to perceived juror abuses are almost never
directed at particular jurors, but rather at the system as a whole.171 Brief reflection, of course,
reveals the importance of the individual characteristics of those who compose juries. Indeed, an
entire industry – based upon state of the art social science – has grown around the belief that
jurors’ predilections affect jury verdicts.172 Yet, nonetheless, the jury as an institution remains
venerated and is widely thought to produce fair and reasonable outcomes.

But many of the reasons that underlie the use of juries in ordinary proceedings are in
tension with their use in constitutional cases. In virtually all instances in which juries are used to
decide constitutional adjudicative facts, the fundamental liberties and protections of the Bill of
Rights and Fourteenth Amendment are involved. These provisions largely enforce countermajoritarian values. The jury, in contrast, is primarily a majoritarian institution. The virtues
associated with the representativeness of jurors has little to recommend it in the task of enforcing
basic individual liberties. The Bill of Rights is a bulwark against potential majoritarian tyranny.
Because the jury represents values associated with the political majority, it cannot be fully
entrusted with protection of the values inherent in the Bill of Rights.

Yet, at the same time, juries in popular literature and numerous historical examples
operate as defenders of liberty against government tyranny.173 Juries sometimes act in counter171
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majoritarian ways and, presumably, in defense of individual liberty. When doing so, however,
juries do not shed their majoritarian identity. In effect, juries check and balance the majoritarian
decision making of the legislative and executive branches of government much as those branches
check one another. Juries remain an essentially democratic institution. Indeed, although juries
have always had the inherent power of nullification, this power is neither officially sanctioned
nor generally acclaimed when it is used. Jurors take an oath to apply the law faithfully and are
considered to have failed that obligation if they act contrary to its dictates. While it is true that a
juror’s responsibility to uphold the law naturally includes fidelity to the Constitution, this does
not affect the analysis in any substantial way. Legislators also take an oath to uphold the
Constitution. Yet the courts have the responsibility to review legislative actions to ensure that
they conform to the Constitution.

Arguably, jury issues that arise under the Sixth Amendment are fundamentally different
from those typically arising under the Seventh Amendment. Under the Sixth Amendment, juries
are charged with finding facts in the process of applying popularly enacted laws. In these cases,
such as New York Times’ actual malice standard or Miller’s test for community standards of
decency, the jury sets constitutional limits as a result of its fact-finding. Under the Seventh
Amendment, in contrast, the government is likely to be the defendant and the question presented
is whether its actions are constitutional. Takings cases and claims of intentional discrimination
under the Equal Protection Clause provide ready examples. Under the Sixth Amendment, the
constitutional issue, at least from the jury’s perspective, mainly will be implicit, whereas the
constitutional query will be front and center in Seventh Amendment cases. Moreover, juries in
Sixth Amendment cases are clearly agents of the government in applying the laws of the land,
whereas they are charged with judging the government’s actions when operating under the
Seventh Amendment.

Although these differences are not unimportant, and in individual cases might influence a
court’s readiness to agree with a jury’s fact-finding, they do not affect the fundamental analysis
here. Whether arising in criminal cases under the Sixth Amendment or civil cases under the
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Seventh Amendment, the jury embodies majoritarian values in a process designed to guarantee
individual rights.

Juries, therefore, like the other representative institutions of government, must be subject
to plenary review by the courts when basic liberties are implicated. Indeed, in many
constitutional contexts, this independent review has the virtue of operating structurally in a
rights-protective fashion. For example, in a criminal obscenity case, two verdicts are possible. If
the jury acquits, either because it did not find the material obscene or believed that the obscenity
laws were too invasive of free speech, there is no review. A jury decision that is rights protective
– or even overly protective – must stand. On the other hand, if a jury convicts on the obscenity
charge, its decision is subject to independent review by the courts.174 Because courts are the final
arbiters of the meaning of the Constitution and thus the ultimate guarantors of the countermajoritarian values inherent in the Bill of Rights, they must review convictions to ensure that
they conform with constitutional guarantees.

In civil cases, as well, judges must independently review jury determinations of
constitutional facts. The reasons for this exacting review parallel those in the criminal context.
Just as in criminal cases, burdensome civil verdicts can chill the exercise of fundamental rights.
Indeed, civil litigation, with its lesser burdens of proof and wide exposure to potentially large
numbers of litigants, leaves the calculation whether to engage in marginal constitutional activities
difficult to make. The uncertainties and vagaries of civil litigation can lead to the chilling of
activities well within constitutionally protected zones. Unlike in criminal cases, courts have the
power to review verdicts that are either protective or unprotective of basic liberties. It is possible
to imagine a standard in civil cases that parallels the one in criminal cases. In effect, this would
constitute a one-way ratchet, resulting in deferential review of rights-protective decisions and de
novo review when basic liberties are endangered. But this ignores the other side of the
constitutional equation. A court’s basic task when interpreting constitutional guarantees is
defining the boundary between the legitimate power of the majority to govern as it deems fit and
174
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the inalienable rights of individuals to sometimes be let alone. Jury verdicts that over-protect
liberties tread upon the inherent right of the majority to govern as it pleases. In criminal cases,
the constitutional balance is set in a way that prefers that any errors redound to the benefit of the
accused, even at some cost to the majority’s sovereignty. In civil cases, however, the calculus is
different. Judges must ensure that civil juries do not find facts in a way that under-protects
individual rights or in a way that under-protects majoritarian will and legitimate government
interests.175

b. Judging credibility of witnesses
One of the inveterate principles of modern evidence law is that appellate courts owe
deference to the fact-finding of lower courts because triers of fact have the opportunity to observe
witnesses and thereby evaluate the credibility of their testimony.176 Although little research data
are available to demonstrate the validity of this venerable practice,177 it is a firmly believed truth
of trial and appellate procedure. But even if it is not entirely true, or at least not as true as most
courts and scholars believe, this assumption nevertheless has cash value. Its value, however, is
largely limited to ordinary litigation. In constitutional cases, a rule of deference is not worth the
costs it imposes on basic liberties.

In ordinary litigation, a combination of factors argue in favor of an appellate standard of
deference to lower court fact-finding. As an initial matter, a large proportion of adjudicative
facts do not recur in other cases and so most adjudicative-fact fact-finding has limited, if any,
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precedential force. Questions such as whether the light was red or green or the defendant’s car
was observed at the scene of the crime, generally do not implicate values or concerns outside of
the immediate trial in which they are adjudicated. There are exceptions to this observation, but
those exceptions tend to lead courts and scholars away from a rule of deference for the very
reasons that they have broader implications. For example, in some contexts, such as when facts
often recur, the question arises whether certain behavior is “reasonable” or “unreasonable” – such
as stopping to look and listen at a railroad crossing – as a general matter. It has long been
accepted that appellate courts play a role in creating standards for situations that repeat.178
Similarly, although the question whether it was the victim’s blood found on the defendant’s coat
may be particular to a single case, the issue of the validity of the DNA technology that provided
the answer to that question is more general and may have precedential import. In both the tort
and scientific evidence examples, there may be good reasons for adopting a less deferential
stance when the facts to be found have import beyond an individual case.179 This same principle
operates in the context of constitutional-adjudicative facts.

A second, and practical, reason for a deferential appellate review standard is that anything
more rigorous would produce substantial work for appellate courts, work which would be mainly
duplicative of what was done below. Although every case is important, and appellate review of
adjudicative fact-finding might catch some errors, on the whole, this argument asserts, the costs
178
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to the system would be too great and, indeed, if done conscientiously, would quickly overwhelm
appellate courts.

At least in free speech cases, the Court has not been persuaded that independent appellate
review of constitutional adjudicative-facts was more work than it could handle.180 In fact, the
Court describes independent review as a constitutional duty that it is obligated to perform. The
primary basis for the Court’s assumption of the burdensome task of independent review is the
fact that adjudicative-fact resolution in constitutional cases affect the exercise of basic rights and
help establish the parameters of the Constitution’s boundaries. In Bose, the Court explained the
need for independent review in free speech cases in the following way:
[T]he Court has regularly conducted an independent review of the record both to be sure
that the speech in question actually falls within the unprotected category and to confine
the perimeters of any unprotected category within acceptably narrow limits in an effort to
ensure that protected expression will not be inhibited. Providing triers of fact with a
general description of the type of communication whose content is unworthy of protection
has not, in and of itself, served sufficiently to narrow the category, nor served to eliminate
the danger that decisions by triers of fact may inhibit the expression of protected ideas.181
Bose clearly recognizes the interconnectedness of constitutional law definition and constitutional
law application. The duty to define the Constitution’s meaning effectively incorporates the duty
to ensure its proper application. This can only be accomplished by some heightened level of
review of constitutional adjudicative fact-finding. In free speech cases this is unambiguously
accomplished by the use of independent review by appellate courts.

In cases outside free speech, what practice applies to constitutional adjudicative-facts is
less clear. Space does not permit a provision-by-provision examination of this question here. As
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a general proposition, however, and for the purposes of the unified theory I propose, it is worth
observing that the basic premises supporting independent appellate review in free speech cases
apply equally to adjudicative facts found pursuant to other provisions of the Constitution.182
Specifically, the dual concerns stated in Bose – the need to ensure that particular cases are
adjudicated correctly as falling within or outside constitutionally defined categories and judicial
regard for the impact litigation has on similarly situated cases – are not unique to free speech
challenges. As is true with other constitutional facts, the degree of rigor courts bring to appellate
review should depend on the constitutional values at stake in the respective context. This must
be decided as a matter of law.
The more fundamental the right or the more protected the class of individuals affected by
the government or state action, the greater the need for independent review. Hence, cases raising
questions of intentional discrimination against suspect classes or which threaten deprivations of
liberty, present compelling arguments for strong independent review. At the same time, when
constitutional adjudicative-facts are presented, but the right or value is not fundamental,
independent review should be more cursory, but still not perfunctory. For example, in Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health,183 the Court recognized that a competent adult has a
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment. But the right itself was not described as
fundamental. As a consequence, future adjudication regarding individual claimants to this right
should not expect strong independent review of the factual question whether the right had been
expressed or not.184

B. Judicial Review of a Legislature’s Fact-Finding
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As might be expected, a legislature’s findings of fact tend to involve primarily
constitutional legislative-facts. Moreover, legislatures ordinarily limit their fact-finding to
constitutional review-facts,185 which typically operate to justify a particular action that may be
challenged under the Constitution. Such facts might support either the ultimate objective of the
law or be used to defend the means chosen to accomplish a particular objective. Complicating
matters somewhat, legislatures sometimes make their factual findings explicit, and sometimes the
legislature’s factual bases are attributed to it after the fact by the lawyers or, occasionally, by the
courts.

Despite the seeming complexity of this arena, the constitutional resolution of the question
of what level of deference is owed legislative fact-finding is fairly straightforward. The standard
of review of legislative fact-finding should abide by the same basic principle that guides the
entire enterprise of judicial review when laws implicate constitutional values. In a wide variety
of constitutional contexts, the Supreme Court has established various substantive tests that differ
in their rigor depending on the depth of the constitutional value involved. For instance, in Due
Process and First Amendment cases, the Court ordinarily applies strict scrutiny when a
fundamental right is implicated, but only rational basis review when the right is not
fundamental.186 The Court has framed its analysis in Equal Protection Clause cases similarly,
applying strict or intermediate scrutiny when a state action discriminates on the basis of a suspect
185

There are exceptions, and legislatures have sometimes sought to set-forth both
constitutional rule-facts and constitutional adjudicative-facts. In Webster v. Reproductive
Services, for example, the Court reviewed a Missouri law which provided in the preamble that
“life begins at conception,” thus seemingly contradicting the constitutional-rule fact adopted in
Roe v. Wade, constructing the trimester framework around viability. Although the Roe Court
expressly declined to say when “life” began, it also precluded state legislatures from enacting
laws that would be premised on an alternative view of the facts. The Webster Court let the
preamble stand, finding that it had no operative effect. Legislative attempts to establish
constitutional adjudicative-facts are relatively rare and when they occur are likely to run afoul of
the principles of separation-of-powers. See, e.g., Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So.2d 321 (Fla. 2004)
(finding “Terri’s Law” unconstitutional in authorizing governor to grant one-time stay to prevent
the withholding of nutrition and hydration from a patient).
186

See generally, Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis,
85 CAL. L. REV. 297 (1997).
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classification, but only rational basis review when no such classification is involved. This
“tailoring” analysis is principally empirical, and courts’ deference to legislative fact-finding
diminishes in direct proportion to the fundamentality of the right.187 The more important the
constitutional value, the more rigorous the review. When fundamental rights are implicated,
courts apply strict scrutiny and the government must demonstrate that the law is closely related to
a compelling government interest. When a constitutional right is deemed non-fundamental, in
contrast, courts determine merely whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate government
interest. Judicial time and attention, therefore, are tied to the depth of the alleged constitutional
infringement. This basic insight should guide courts’ hands in reviewing a legislature’s factfinding generally. Hence, the greater the constitutional demand for oversight of legislative
decision-making – i.e., the more deeply constitutional values are implicated – the less deferential
courts should be to a legislature’s factual findings.

Unfortunately, the answer to the question of how much deference is owed cannot be
premised simply on preexisting standards of judicial review, such as rational basis or strict
scrutiny. Although basic doctrine often distinguishes in theory between strict scrutiny and
rational basis review, the actual practice by which courts safeguard basic liberties is rather more
complicated and considerably more convoluted. In the context of individual freedoms, two
problems, in particular, are worthy of note. First, over the last thirty years, the Court has
regularly departed from a strict and categorical approach to two-tiered scrutiny.188 The clearest
example of this is the Court’s adoption of intermediate scrutiny in several constitutional areas,
including gender discrimination189 and regulation of commercial speech.190
187

See generally Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term – Foreward: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 33-36 (1972).
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See generally Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?,
6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945 (2004).
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See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. of N.Y., 447 U.S.
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The second problem is that in different constitutional contexts the same test is manifested
in different ways. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm. of N.Y., for
example, the Court applied intermediate scrutiny to commercial speech and elaborated a fourpart test to determine whether a regulation infringed upon the First Amendment Right. In United
States v. Virginia (the VMI case),191 the Court similarly applied intermediate scrutiny but noted
that the government must have an “exceedingly persuasive” justification for discriminating on
the basis of gender, and, in that case, applied it rigorously to strike down a scheme of separate
education that had been upheld by both the trial and appellate courts below. In United States v.
O’Brien,192 the Court framed still another intermediate scrutiny test, this time for expressive
conduct, but applied it with much less rigor then might be expected from a test of heightened
scrutiny.193 Intermediate scrutiny, as a practical matter, has become something of a catch-all for
a constitutional domain ranging from rational basis analysis with bite to strict scrutiny without
teeth.

In many other constitutional areas, the Court’s statement of review is less than plainly
stated, or, at least, not plainly applied. In Grutter v. Bollinger, for instance, the Court applied a
sort of deferential strict scrutiny to the University of Michigan’s affirmative action program on
the theory that universities enjoy a special privilege to make education judgments by virtue of the
First Amendment.194 Outside of the Bill of Rights, the Court similarly has failed to state with
precision the standard of review that applied. For instance, the Court has employed the
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518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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See generally Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws,
Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1282-83 (2005).
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Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (“We have long recognized that,
given the important purpose of public education..., universities occupy a special niche in our
constitutional tradition.”).
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deferential test in dormant commerce clause cases in a non-deferential manner,195 and under the
generally deferential Commerce Clause, the Court has applied the test non-deferentially.196 In
general, the underlying principle the Court seems to apply in its cases is to be less deferential to
legislatures the more deeply constitutional values are implicated by the legislation.197 But the
justices are not always candid or consistent regarding their views of the depth of particular
constitutional provisions.198
195

See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 675-76 (1981)
(“Less deference to the legislative judgment is due, however, where the local regulation bears
disproportionately on out-of-state residents and businesses.”; S. Pac. Co. v. Ariz., 325 U.S. 761,
770-80 (1945) (removing extremely detailed railroad safety findings made by trial court without
any mention of deference to legislature).
196

See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) (criticizing Congress’s
“method of reasoning”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995) (“as part of our
independent evaluation of constitutionality under the Commerce Clause we of course consider
legislative findings, and indeed even congressional committee findings, regarding effect on
interstate commerce”) (emphasis added), citing Heart of Atlanta, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964). See, also, Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026 (1992) (“[T]he
legislature’s recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be the basis for departing from our
categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be compensated.”); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm., 483 U.S. 825, 838 (1987) (rejecting Commission’s finding that beach access easement
was factually related to construction of a beach house).
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Compare United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (“regulatory
legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional
unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such character as to
preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and
experience of the legislators”) with id. at 153, n.4 (“There may be narrower scope for operation
of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its fact to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed
equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.”).
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Compare Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2215 (June 6, 2005) (holding that
the Controlled Substances Act that criminalized the manufacture, distribution or possession of
marijuana to intrastate growers and users of marijuana for medical purposes did not violate the
Commerce Clause) with United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000) (holding that
Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause by enacting a civil rights remedy
provision in the Violence Against Women Act); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 222728 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[i]f, as the Court claims, today's decision does not
break with precedent, how can it be that voluminous findings, documenting extensive hearings
about the specific topic of violence against women, did not pass constitutional muster in
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Although the exact tests used by the Court remain murky, the Court has never shied away
from the task of reviewing a legislature’s constitutional fact- finding when basic constitutional
values are implicated. Examples abound in the Court’s enforcement of the First Amendment
guarantee of free speech.199 Similarly, in the Equal Protection context, the Court has been quite
willing to question or ignore legislative findings when suspect classifications are involved.200
Even under the arguably more permissive intermediate scrutiny applied to gender-based
classifications, the Court has displayed little deference to legislative fact-finding.201 Finally, the
Court’s privacy cases under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment display the
Morrison, while the CSA's abstract, unsubstantiated, generalized findings about controlled
substances do?”).
199

See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 241-42, 251-58 (200)
(setting forth Congress’s enacted findings and later rejecting each as insufficient to support
constitutionality); Bartnicki v. Vapper, 532 U.S. 514, 531n.17 (2001) (noting that “the dissent
argues that we have not given proper respect to ‘congressional findings’ or to ‘Congress’s factual
predictions’... [b]ut the relevant factual foundation is not to be found in the legislative record”)
(citation omitted); Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1924) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (rejecting
the assertion in Gitlow v. N.Y., 268 U.S. 652, 668-671, that a legislative determination that
“utterances advocating the overthrow of organized government by force, violence and unlawful
means, are so inimical to the general welfare and involve such danger of substantive evil that
they may be “given great weight”).
200

See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226-27 (1995) (reaffirming
the Croson view that “all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
government actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny”); Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) (“none of [the City Council’s] ‘findings,’ singly or
together, provide the city of Richmond with a ‘strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that
[race-based] remedial action was necessary.’”).
201

See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 200-01 (1976) (dismissing statistics
offered to support State legislation imposing a different minimum age, based on gender, for
purchasing beer as weak, inaccurate, and failing to closely serve the objectives of the legislation);
United States v. Va., 518 U.S. 515, 543 (1996) (dismissing the testimony of Virginia’s experts
that the admission of women to the all-male Virginia Military Institute would be so radical as to
destroy the program as an unproven judgment, “a prediction hardly different from other ‘selffulfilling prophec[ies]’ once routinely used to deny rights or opportunities.”) (internal citations
omitted). But see Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001) (upholding different citizenship rules
according to the gender of the citizen-parent).
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same disregard for the findings of legislatures,202 and this is true even when the Court explicitly
employs the most deferential standard of rational basis review.203

Seemingly inconsistent with this steady drumbeat of little or no deference across a large
part of the constitutional spectrum, the Court regularly extols the fact-finding capabilities of
legislatures.204 This compliment to legislatures’ empirical acumen is a function primarily of the
Court’s recognition that legislators typically have greater resources at their disposal than
judges.205 Legislators can sponsor research, hold hearings, and call expert witnesses. They also
have great flexibility to refine their research questions and redefine the scope, direction, and size
of any inquiry. Justice Souter made this point in his concurrence in Washington v.
Glucksberg,206 writing that legislatures “have more flexible mechanisms for fact-finding than the
judiciary,” as well as “the power to experiment, moving forward and pulling back as facts emerge

202

See, e.g., Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 505 (1965) (White, J., concurring)
(rejecting asserted purpose that ban on contraceptive use furthered “the State’s policy against all
forms of promiscuous or illicit sexual relationships, be they premarital or extramarital”); Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (scrutinizing whether State’s asserted
goals are furthered by criminalizing contraceptive use); Skinner v. Okla., 316 U.S. 535, 546
(1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) (rejecting state’s theory of biological determinism); Pierce v.
Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (finding right to send one’s children to private school
and noting “there is nothing in the present records to indicate that [private schools] have failed to
discharge their obligations to patrons, students or the State ... [a]nd there are no peculiar
circumstances or present emergencies which demand extraordinary measures relative to primary
education”); Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (legislative preference for forming a more
homogeneous society insufficient to justify ban on teaching of foreign languages).
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See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003).
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See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976) (Legislatures “are better qualified to weigh and ‘evaluate the results of
statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is
not available to the courts.’”).
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In the case of Congress’s empirical acumen, the Court’s respect for a coordinate
branch of government might also play a role in statements of deference.
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521 U.S. 707 (1997).
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within their own jurisdictions.”207 Courts, by comparison, are more limited, since they cannot
initiate or fund research, and the factual questions that come before them are fairly well defined
by either the controlling law or the parties. Judges, unlike legislators, rarely ask witnesses
questions and usually do not specify which experts will be called to testify. These institutional
differences have led the Court to repeatedly express its preference for Congressional fact-finding
and point out its own limited capacity to match the resources legislatures can bring to fact-based
inquiries.208

While the power of legislatures to gather facts must be duly recognized, this
acknowledgment does not necessarily affect the standard of review courts bring to legislative
fact-finding. Courts too are fact-finders. Legislatures may excel in defining and financing
research, but the courts excel at hearing controverted evidence and coming to a decision free of
partisan influence. Particularly federal courts, largely insulated from the shifting political tides,
are able to evaluate evidence in a systematic and careful fashion. District courts hear the
evidence and accordingly must evaluate the credibility of witnesses and the reliability and
validity of proffered expert testimony. Moreover, there is rarely a shortage of qualified expert
opinion. Especially in high-profile constitutional litigation, the factual questions turn largely on
disputed research data and expert evidence regarding general research findings and professional
opinion. While the judiciary may not be as well designed institutionally as the legislative branch
to gather these data, courts are especially well designed to evaluate them.

Adopting a non-deferential standard of review in constitutional cases will not dissuade
legislatures from compiling a full record. Indeed, a legislature that anticipates confronting a
207

Id. at 788.
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Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 , 550 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting)
(“Congress is far better equipped than the judiciary to evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing
upon complex issues”); Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 330
(1985) (“When Congress makes findings on essentially factual issues such as these, those
findings are of course entitled to a great deal of deference, inasmuch as Congress is an institution
better equipped to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing on such an issue”).
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rigorous standard of review when the matter reaches the courts should be expected to do more to
ensure a compelling factual record. A legislature’s natural advantage to invest in research and
gather factual knowledge should allow it to put together a full record for the courts’ inspection.
In constitutional contexts in which the courts are obligated to protect basic liberties or enforce
structural barriers, they must independently review the bases for legislative actions. Rigorous
and close evaluation of a legislature’s factual premises in appropriate cases maximizes the
benefits to be gained from each of the two branches of government. Legislatures’ greater
capacity to produce factual information complements the judiciary’s natural advantage of
reviewing the facts largely insulated from the pressures of partisan politics. The better the record
amassed by a legislature, the easier will be the judiciary’s task in carrying out its constitutional
function.
C. Lower Court Review of Higher Court Fact-Finding
The standard model of constitutional fact-finding is limited to the description of factual
findings as they move up the judicial hierarchy. The previous sections focused primarily on
establishing a coherent foundation for this standard model of facts being integrated into
constitutional doctrine as cases ascend toward the Supreme Court. But inherent in my approach
was the basic insight that facts are dynamic over time, in that they themselves might change with
advancing technology or an evolving society, or that our knowledge of them might change as
more research is completed. This insight poses a crisis for the standard model, since the model
entirely fails to account for it. Specifically, what happens in constitutional jurisprudence when
the facts change? In this section, I consider the most controversial aspect of my uniform theory.
In particular, can lower courts revisit precedent in order to adjust earlier rulings to account for a
changed factual landscape? My answer to this question is sometimes yes, sometimes no, and is
contingent on the type of fact involved.

1. General Considerations
It goes without saying that the judiciary is structured hierarchically. Higher court legal
judgments are binding on lower courts. This would appear to be especially so in the
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constitutional arena. But what happens when settled law relies upon changeable facts? If the
predicate facts of a higher court’s holding change, should subsequent courts revisit the holding
given this new information? The answer to this might very well depend on an assortment of
considerations. Indeed, this subject implicates many foundational premises of the American
constitutional system. Given the richness of the subject and the large role facts play in
constitutional decision making, it is surprising that the Court has given so little attention to this
matter.

Perhaps the only time that the issue was squarely presented regarding a lower court’s
power to distinguish precedent on the basis that predicate facts had changed was in Roper v.
Simmons.209 The principal issue in Roper concerned the constitutionality of imposing the death
penalty on those who were sixteen or seventeen years-old when they committed their crimes. In
1989, in Stanford v. Kentucky,210 the Court had held that this practice did not offend the
Constitution. In 2003, however, the Missouri Supreme Court distinguished Stanford on the basis
that the predicate facts on which that decision rested had changed and ruled that executing those
who had committed their crimes when they were under 18-years of age violated the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.211 In particular, the Missouri Court
in Roper found a shift in public sentiment nationally indicating that such punishment now ran
afoul of contemporary standards of decency. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two
questions. The first was the constitutionality of executing those who had committed their crimes
as juveniles. The second concerned the question at issue here: “Once this Court holds that a
particular punishment is not ‘cruel and unusual’ and thus barred by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, can a lower court reach a contrary decision based on its own analysis of evolving
standards?”212
209
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Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court did not mention, or even allude to, the second
question presented. The Court, instead, limited its analysis to the principal question, the
constitutionality of executing minors. Affirming the Missouri decision, the Court held that
imposing capital punishment on juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and
unusual punishment. The Court relied on three grounds for its holding, all of which involved
statements of scientific or social scientific fact. First, based on surveys of state practice, the
Court agreed with the Missouri court that since Stanford the national consensus had shifted
sufficiently to cast doubt that executing juveniles met modern “civilized standards of
decency.”213 In addition, second, the Court found that juveniles were distinguishable from adults
in three ways that indicated that they “cannot with reliability be classified among the worst
offenders.”214 These grounds included juveniles’ (1) underdeveloped sense of responsibility and
general immaturity as compared to adults, (2) susceptibility to outside influence and peer
pressure, and (3) lack of fully formed characters. These three characteristics indicated juveniles’
diminished culpability which, according to the Court, meant “that the penological justifications
for the death penalty apply to them with lesser force than to adults.”215 The final argument
advanced by the Court to support its holding was “the stark reality that the United States is the
only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”216

While the majority opinion ignored the question of a lower court’s power to find facts
contrary to higher court authority, the separate dissents of Justices O’Connor and Scalia did not.
Both justices took extreme umbrage at the lower court’s temerity. O’Connor wrote that she took
213
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Id. at 1196. The Court rejected the possibility of evaluating each juvenile
defendant’s maturity on a case by case basis. “The differences between juvenile and adult
offenders are too marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the
death penalty despite insufficient culpability.” Id. at 1197.
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“issue with the Court’s failure to reprove, or even to acknowledge, the Supreme Court of
Missouri’s unabashed refusal to follow our controlling decision in Stanford.”217 She conceded
that the Eighth Amendment rule calling for a contemporary assessment of “evolving standards of
decency” meant that “significant changes in societal mores over time may require us to
reevaluate a prior decision.”218 But, she emphasized, “it remains ‘this Court’s prerogative alone
to overrule one of its precedents.’”219 Finally, she warned, “[b]y affirming the lower court’s
judgment without so much as a slap on the hand, today’s decision threatens to invite frequent and
disruptive reassessments of our Eighth Amendment precedents.”220

Justice Scalia similarly found the contumacious behavior of the lower court intolerable.
As an initial matter, he rejected the entire premise that the Eighth Amendment’s meaning
changes with evolving standards of decency.221 Scalia said that it “add[s] insult to injury” that
the “Court affirms the Missouri Supreme Court without even admonishing that court for its
flagrant disregard of our precedent in Stanford.”222 The lower court’s insolence, according to
Scalia, was a product of a jurisprudence that permitted the Constitution’s meaning to change as
circumstances changed. He observed as follows:
The Court has purported to make of the Eighth Amendment ... a mirror of the passing and
changing sentiment of American society regarding penology. The lower courts can look
into that mirror as well as we can; and what we saw 15 years ago bears no necessary
217
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Id. at 1217 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“What a mockery today’s opinion makes of
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relationship to what they see today. Since they are not looking at the same text, but at a
different scene, why should our earlier decision control their judgment?223
In addition, Scalia noted that this danger was not limited to any “special character” of the Eighth
Amendment. “Nothing in the text reflects such a distinctive character – and we have certainly
applied the ‘maturing values’ rationale to give brave new meaning to other provisions of the
Constitution, such as the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.”224 Left
unchecked, Scalia warned, the majority’s permissiveness would allow lower courts to reinterpret
the Constitution “whenever they decide enough time has passed for a new snap shot.”225 This
outcome “leaves this Court’s decisions without any force,” a result that “crown[s] arbitrariness
with chaos.”226

Possibly the starkest example of the nightmare Justice Scalia envisions, and one that
might unsettle the more liberal-minded justices as well, comes from Stell v. Savannah-Chatham,
discussed in Section I. In summarily reversing the Stell district court, the Fifth Circuit stated that
“no inferior federal court may refrain from acting as required by [the Brown] decision even if
such a court should conclude that the Supreme Court erred as to its facts or as to the law.”227
Further, the circuit court discounted the importance of the social science evidence for the Brown
result. “We do not read the major premise of the decision of the Supreme Court in the first
Brown case as being limited to the facts of the cases there presented. We read it,” the court
observed, “as proscribing segregation in the public education process on the stated ground that
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separate but equal schools for the races were inherently unequal.”228

The Fifth Circuit, therefore, made two arguments for why the Stell trial court had erred.
The first was that a lower court was bound by the factual findings and legal conclusions of a
higher court, and the second was that the holding in Brown had not depended on the factual
findings set forth in the opinion. The latter argument was not controversial in itself, since it
simply concerned the appellate court’s assertion that the trial court had misinterpreted the Brown
decision. Whereas the trial court had believed that Brown was premised on the fact-based
psychological consequences of segregation, the Fifth Circuit held that it rested on the legal
principle of equality. If this legal assessment had been the full extent of the Fifth Circuit’s
decision, it would have been unremarkable.

The Fifth Circuit’s former statement – that the trial court had inappropriately
reconsidered factual findings previously made by a higher court – is considerably more open to
question. The Fifth Circuit essentially held that lower courts do not have the power to reconsider
the predicate facts of otherwise binding precedent. But the court did not explain the basis for this
conclusion. It simply assumed that it was obviously correct, much as Justice O’Connor assumed
the obviousness of this determination in Roper. The conclusion that lower courts cannot revisit
constitutional facts – and, in due course, higher court constitutional precedent – is not at all
obvious. This statement of the law is too broad, for it fails to consider the different kinds of
constitutional facts that percolate up and trickle down the hierarchy of the courts. While this
principle of deference might be obviously correct regarding some kinds of constitutional facts, it
is not as regards all kinds of constitutional facts. The three basic kinds of fact – rule, review, and
adjudicative – present very different issues regarding their place in the lexicon of constitutional
doctrine.

2. Specific Considerations
A basic argument of this Article is that facts should be taken seriously when they are
228

Id.
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offered as a component of constitutional decision making. Implicit in this argument is the
assumption that “facts” are out there to be found. I don’t mean to suggest, however, that
constitutional facts – of whatever variety – can always be found with a high degree of certainty or
without a good deal of baggage associated with the socially constructed worlds of their finders.
Facts, whether they concern the question of when a fetus has the lung capacity to survive outside
the womb or the question of the empirical consequences of locating adult-entertainment
establishments in particular neighborhoods, are known with more or less certainty. The potential
for error associated with virtually all fact-finding means that, as a normative matter, the law must
allocate the risks associated with making a mistake. The law primarily accomplishes this through
procedural devices such as burdens of proof and presumptions. In criminal cases, for instance,
where the consequences of making an error of guilt (“false positive”) are substantial, the “beyond
a reasonable doubt” rule is used; in civil cases, in which similar errors of inclusion have less
gravity, the more lenient “preponderance of the evidence” standard is employed. In
constitutional fact-finding, the prospect of error (whether of the false positive or false negative
variety) should be a key element in the development of rules of procedure. As a consequence,
therefore, the issue of how well the fact must be known is a legal determination. Viability, for
example, is actually a statistical prediction of fetus survivability. Whether the probability of
survival must be 10% or 90%, estimates that directly correspond with gestational age, must be
resolved as a matter of law. What the probability of survival is at, say, 27 weeks, on the other
hand, is a constitutional review-fact.

Professor Davis’ original division between legislative and adjudicative facts was based
largely on the identity of the fact-finder deciding the fact, rather than the legal relevance of the
fact. If the fact was found by lawmakers, it was legislative, and if found by the trier of fact (jury,
or, if none, judge), it was adjudicative. There was thus a degree of circularity in his taxonomy.
The very same fact might be described as adjudicative, because it was part of a jury’s
deliberations, and legislative, because a lawmaker used it to form or interpret the law. To a large
extent, I turn Davis’ scheme on its head. In my taxonomy, facts are classified on the basis of the
demands of constitutional doctrine. What facts are material to the resolution of a constitutional
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dispute, therefore, depend on a reading of the Constitution. Thus, for example, whether the issue
of the factual consequences of a spousal notification provision, as presented in Casey, is a
review-fact or an adjudicative-fact depends on the values inherent in the Due Process Clause.
Similarly, in Roper, the Court interpreted the factual issue of minors’ psychological and
physiological cognitive development as a class-based review-fact, rather than a subject of caseby-case determination as an adjudicative fact. The decision to treat minors as a class, rather than
require individualized assessments of a minor’s particular cognitive capacity, was a function of
the Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.229 As a general matter, very different
consequences follow depending on what type of constitutional fact is involved. The costs and
benefits associated with those consequences are a matter of constitutional import. The following
sections consider some of those costs and benefits in regard to the single issue of whether a lower
court should have the authority to reconsider higher court precedent when the facts – or our
knowledge of the fact – on which that precedent depend have changed.

a. Constitutional rule-facts
Constitutional-rule facts are relevant to the definition of, or establish the foundation for, a
constitutional rule or standard. Although the line between rule and review facts can sometimes
be blurry, in most cases the distinction will be clear. The distinction is based on the difference
between interpreting the Constitution and applying it. In Roe v. Wade, for instance, the Court
established viability as the point in time when the state’s interests were sufficiently compelling to
justify prohibitions of abortion, subject to exceptions for the health of the mother. In Casey, the
Court reaffirmed this rule, calling it the “central holding” of Roe. The selection of viability was
based on a host of arguments, including historical practices, the nature of the doctor-patient
relationship, precedent, and, in the end, the Court’s assessment of the strength of the state’s
interest in preserving the potential life of the fetus. The Court balanced the nature of the right
against the strength of the state’s interest and established a standard that was fastened to the point
229
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at which a fetus was likely to survive outside the womb. Viability thus became the rule to be
applied in subsequent cases.

Describing viability as the rule to be applied suggests that if medical technology were to
change, the contour of the “right” would change as well. Hence, if viability is the rule, and
viability moves from 22-24 weeks to 10-12 weeks as a matter of medical fact, then the right of
reproductive choice should presumably move as well. Indeed, this is one of the principal features
of employing rules that depend on possibly different circumstances occurring from those that
existed when the rule was first set-forth. It could be argued that the compromise point – viability
– was really chosen for certain unstated reasons, such as giving the pregnant woman sufficient
time to exercise her right to an abortion. Under this interpretation of Roe, the “rule” is not
viability at all, but rather the end of the second trimester – 24 weeks – approximately the time at
which viability occurred in 1973. Of course, changes in technology or medical science would not
affect the 24-weeks rule. But the Court never said that the rule was 24-weeks; it said, and
thereafter has maintained, that the rule is “viability” – whenever that should occur.

The issue of what the “rule” is in Roe is reminiscent of the debate following Brown v.
Board of Education as to whether the holding in that case depended on the factual question of
segregation’s effects or on the inherent inequality of separate schooling. If the former, then
subsequent research could result in different outcomes and segregated education might pass
constitutional muster. This, of course, was the Stell district court’s reading of Brown. If the
latter, the rule would be that segregated schools are per se unconstitutional, the Fifth Circuit’s
reading of the case. Given the modern test of strict scrutiny, it appears that the district court’s
interpretation of Brown was the more accurate one and that, at least if the state’s interests were
compelling enough, segregation might be constitutional under certain, albeit extraordinary,
circumstances.230 If this interpretation is correct, then the Stell court’s attempt to distinguish
230
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Brown based on different factual circumstances was wrong because it got the facts wrong, not
because it should have refrained from any reconsideration of how the equality rule of Brown
should be applied when the factual circumstances have changed.231

Similarly, subsequent precedent should reveal whether the rule in Roe was viability or 24weeks. If the former, then changing technology should lead the Court to contemplate an
alteration in the 24-week point-in-time, whereas if the latter, then 24-weeks should remain
inviolate, subject always to the possibility of it being replaced with another rule. The answer
seemed to come from Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.232 In Webster, the Court upheld
a Missouri law that, among other things, required physicians to use medically appropriate tests to
determine whether a fetus was viable at twenty or more weeks of gestational age.233 Although
the Court did not discuss the issue explicitly, it effectively accepted the Missouri scheme of
treating viability as a constitutional adjudicative-fact. After 20 weeks, the viability of every fetus
was to be measured individually. In contrast, if Roe had stood for an inviolate rule of 24-weeks,
the Missouri viability testing provision would have been invalid as a matter of law. Under Roe,
therefore, at least as it is presently applied, viability is the rule and, in some situations, will be
applied on a case-by-case basis.

The decision in Roe to adopt a rule employing the medical concept of viability also
depended partly on factual arguments. In particular, Justice Blackmun cited extensive historical
sources regarding both ancient and more contemporary abortion practices. Indeed, justices
contemptuous of Roe’s holding have long expressed strong disagreement with this historical
analysis.234 What if, then, a lower court had access to a new and definitive examination of the
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The Stell Court incorrectly reevaluated the factual question based on evidence that
was available and which had been considered by the Supreme Court in Brown.
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Id. at 526. The statute provided that a twenty-week-old fetus was presumed valid,
so that viability testing effectively placed the burden of proof on the woman to disprove viability.
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historical issues surveyed in Roe, should that Court have the authority to reconsider the rule of
viability? Or suppose that a treasure trove of historical documents were discovered that indicated
unequivocally that the drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment uniformly believed
that adoption of the Equal Protection Clause would not result in integrated public schools.
Would a lower court have the power to employ these new facts to reassess the continuing validity
of the holding in Brown?

The answer to these and similar questions is no. Lower courts cannot have the authority
to reevaluate the empirical bases for constitutional rules or standards. Many reasons support this
conclusion. Foremost, the basic working premise of my theory is that facts must be taken
seriously in constitutional adjudication. This premise has two consequences in the case of
constitutional rule-facts. First, the sort of facts involved must be susceptible to being found with
some measure of certainty, and second, they must, as far as they go, be subject to independent
treatment as a matter of constitutional authority.

As regards the first reason, most constitutional rule-facts are amorphous, highly intricate,
often defy replication, and are simply not amenable to rigorous study and exacting analysis.
Rule-facts, as discussed in detail in Section II.B.1, are disproportionately historical in nature or
involve highly intricate issues regarding the structural operation of governing constitutional law.
The history of abortion practices, the original intentions of the ratifiers of the Second
Amendment, the comparative advantage of states to operate as laboratories of experimentation,
and so on, are all questions at bottom empirical, but for which answers will remain general
approximations at best.

The second reason for not allowing lower courts the authority to reconsider the empirical
grounds for constitutional rules or standards is even more compelling. Almost invariably,
constitutional rule-facts operate seamlessly with other authorities used to assess constitutional
early as 1821, the first state law dealing directly with abortion was enacted by the Connecticut
Legislature.... By the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, there were at
least 36 laws enacted by state or territorial legislatures limiting abortion.”).
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meaning. It can only very rarely be said that any particular rule would have been different if the
facts had been different. If the constitutional rule would not have been different under different
rule-facts, subsequent changes in the fact or our knowledge of the fact should not affect the
continuing validity of the rule. Any procedure that would permit lower courts to reconsider
constitutional rule-facts on their way toward revisiting the continuing validity of constitutional
rules would have to demonstrate the essentialness of rule-facts to constitutional rules. In almost
all cases, however, constitutional rule-facts do not play this essential role. Constitutional-rule
facts are almost invariably set-forth as part of a litany of premises offered to support a rule or
standard. Rarely do they stand alone, and when they do they are often considered – at the time or
later – as proxies for normative principles or values. The historical premises underlying
conclusions regarding original intent are routinely buttressed by arguments from the text,
precedent, and constitutional structure.235 The Constitution’s meaning is stitched together from a
patchwork of authorities and a change in the understanding of one or two will not necessarily
undermine the soundness of the rule.

As a practical matter, therefore, the boundary between fact and value is nearly impossible
to ascertain when a doctrine is premised on constitutional-rule facts and other considerations.
Given the relationship between values and facts in interpreting the Constitution’s meaning,
disentangling rule-facts from other authorities would be impossible in the vast majority, if not in
all, cases. The authorities the Court relies upon to discern the Constitution’s meaning tend to be
a mixture of normative and empirical and their respective contributions to a given rule cannot be
ascertained. As a consequence, finding constitutional rule-facts is a component of law-making
and ought to be subject to the ordinary rules of judicial hierarchy. Lower courts, therefore, are
bound to adhere to constitutional rules and standards, notwithstanding changes, however
dramatic, in the facts or our knowledge of the facts supporting them.

b. Constitutional adjudicative-facts
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Adjudicative-facts occupy the opposite pole from that of rule-facts in constitutional cases.
Whereas rule-facts affect whole areas of law and are an inextricable component of law-making,
adjudicative-facts have minimal impact outside the immediate litigation in which they are
found.236 Because constitutional adjudicative-facts are unique to particular cases, they appear to
present little difficulty on the question of lower court power to reconsider higher court precedent.
And this will be true in most situations, mainly because there will be no higher court rulings on
the specific factual question. In a defamation case, for instance, the application of the New York
Times v. Sullivan “actual malice” test will be highly context-specific. The question of whether a
statement was made “with knowledge or reckless disregard of its falsity,” will have to be
determined on a case by case basis.237 At the same time, however, two aspects of constitutional
adjudicative fact-finding implicate principles that transcend individual cases. The first involves
the obvious one that the initial definition of the applicable test is a matter of law. The choice of
the “actual malice” standard itself, then, is a rule that could only be reconsidered by the Supreme
Court. The second aspect of constitutional adjudicative-facts is a component of the first, but
worthy of separate consideration. The burden of proof that must be met in constitutional cases is
set as a matter of law.

The subject of burdens of proof is considerably more inscrutable than the usual
discussions among legal practitioners would indicate. There is little question that the “ultimate”
burden of proof must be set as a matter of law and is binding on lower courts. For example, as
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Constitutional adjudicative-facts have somewhat greater impact than ordinary
adjudicative-facts simply because of their constitutional genesis. Although their resolution might
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For example, in the area of free speech, an adjudication that certain materials are obscene in one
locale could chill their dissemination in other areas, even though the materials might not be
deemed “obscene” in those areas.
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-81-

discussed above, in Addington v. Texas,238 the Court held that the state must meet the “clear and
convincing” evidence standard in order to civilly commit an allegedly mentally ill and dangerous
person. But this seemingly straightforward requirement hides a fair amount of empirical
complexity. In particular, consider the element of “dangerousness” that, together with mental
illness, must be demonstrated by the state in commitment cases. Most recently, this issue has
been discussed in the sub-class of potential committees popularly referred to as “sexually violent
predators” (SVP).

In SVP cases, the Court has held that the state must prove that the defendant is both
mentally abnormal239 and dangerous. The Court, however, has yet to say how dangerous an
alleged SVP must be in order to satisfy the second prong of the test, though it is likely to be at
least by clear and convincing evidence and possibly by a stricter standard yet. If clear and
convincing evidence is estimated as approximately a 75 percent likelihood, and proof beyond a
reasonable doubt as exceeding a 90 percent likelihood, very few alleged SVPs would in fact
qualify for commitment. The level of social scientific technology is not sophisticated enough to
permit predictions with this level of certainty.240 But if these levels of proof mean something
different, then the state might be able to meet its evidentiary burdens with today’s technology.

Although the Supreme Court has yet to consider the issue of what quantum of proof of
future violence is constitutionally mandated in SVP cases, state courts have weighed-in on the
matter. In People v. Ghilotti,241 for instance, the California Supreme Court interpreted a
California statute that provided for the commitment of a person who has a “diagnosed mental
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In Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), the Court held that civil
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disorder so that he or she is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence without appropriate
treatment and custody.”242 The State argued that “likely” does not mean “probable” or “more
likely than not.” The State urged that likely meant “a significant chance, not minimal; something
less than ‘more likely than not’ and more than merely ‘possible.’”243 The defendant, in contrast,
argued that “likely” meant “highly likely,” or at least “more likely than not.”244 The California
court sided with the state and found that “‘likely to engage in acts of sexual violence’ does not
mean the risk of reoffense must be higher than 50 percent.”245 The court explained as follows:
[T]he phrase requires a determination that, as the result of a current mental disorder
which predisposes the person to commit violent sex offenses, he or she presents a
substantial danger – that is, a serious and well-founded risk of reoffending in this way if
free.246
Under California law, therefore, the kind of proof required is the substantial danger
test.247 Yet, the burden of proof under the applicable statute is the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard. The court found no incongruity in asking juries to determine whether, by proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, the defendant “presents a serious and well-founded risk of committing new
acts of criminal sexual violence.”248 In effect, the California test asks the jury to determine with
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Id. Oddly, the court sought support for its definition of the word “likely” from
thesauruses rather than dictionaries. As Justice Werdegar pointed out in dissent, “[o]ne should
look to a dictionary, rather than a thesaurus, for a definitive statement of a word’s meaning.” Id.
at 931 n.3 (Werdegar, J., dissenting). She found that such a search supported a “more likely than
not” meaning for the word “likely.” Id.
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near certainty (“beyond a reasonable doubt”) that there is a significant probability (something
less than 50%) that the defendant will be violent. And, indeed, when it comes to scientific
statements of fact, it is not unusual to speak in these terms.249 It would not be incongruous, for
instance, for a meteorologist to express 95 percent confidence that the chance of rain tomorrow is
60 percent.250 In the same way, as Ghilotti arguably requires in California, juries must determine
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt (90-95%?) that the defendant is likely (25-30%?) to be
sexually violent.

Constitutional adjudicative-facts, therefore, while substantially more straightforward than
rule- and review-facts, nonetheless possess a fair measure of complexity. As a practical matter,
constitutional adjudicative-facts are case dependent and thus ostensibly within the procedural
dictates of ordinary trial procedures. Also, because they do not repeat identically from case-tocase, there is little question but that a lower court is not bound by a higher court’s previous
pronouncements.251 At the same time, frameworks surrounding adjudicative fact definition and
their determination in constitutional cases are subjects of law and thus established in the ordinary
course of law development.

c. Constitutional review-facts
So far, there has been little of great controversy in my elucidation of constitutional facts
in this section, in that I have concluded that rule-facts should be decided as matters of law and
reasonable doubt that the defendant “(1) previously was convicted of qualifying violent sex
crimes, [and] (2) has a mental disorder which seriously impairs volitional control of violent
sexual impulses.” Id.
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adjudicative-facts should largely be subject to ordinary fact-finding rules, albeit closely
scrutinized on appellate review. Although most judges and scholars have given little attention to
these issues, if they had, most would agree with at least the broad outlines of my analysis to this
point. But such agreement likely ends here. By far the most difficult situation is presented by
constitutional review-facts, a category that includes the vast majority of facts in constitutional
cases. Review-facts are relevant under a particular interpretation of the Constitution – i.e., some
constitutional rule or standard – and, by definition, their resolution has precedential import in
other cases. There is no shortage of examples, including some of the better known being the
point at which the fetus becomes viable,252 the effects of segregation on black school children,253
the general effects of virtual child pornography,254 the group dynamics associated with jurysize,255 the effects of spousal notification provisions,256 and so on.257 As regards these sorts of
facts, lower courts should have the authority to distinguish higher court rulings when there is
substantial proof that the facts themselves have changed or our knowledge of the facts have
changed, so long as those facts were necessary and sufficient for the earlier ruling.

In Casey, for example, the Court set forth the “undue burden” standard which, in turn,
established the relevance of the factual issue of whether a challenged regulation poses a
“substantial obstacle” to the exercise of the abortion right. In Casey itself, the Court invalidated
the Pennsylvania spousal notification provision primarily on the basis of research indicating its
252
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potentially burdensome nature, at least in a small percentage of cases. The Court, however,
refused to invalidate the 24-hour waiting provision, with the Joint Opinion observing that, “on
the record before us,” the research does not demonstrate that the waiting requirement posed a
substantial obstacle to the exercise of the abortion right.258 Presumably, the Court understood
that research might someday demonstrate the burdensomeness of waiting periods and, moreover,
that other regulations might be challenged as being unduly burdensome. Lower courts should
have the latitude, indeed the obligation, to review the evidence to determine whether the
regulation passes muster under the Casey standard.

The power to review the predicate facts of precedent would not, however, give lower
courts carte blanche to challenge higher court authority with which they disagree. When
assessing the continuing validity of a precedent, lower courts would have to resolve two issues in
a satisfactory and unequivocal way. First, the court would have to determine that the changed
fact was necessary and sufficient for the earlier ruling; and second, it would have to put forward
sufficient proof to support the new findings of fact.

The first consideration, whether the review-facts were necessary and sufficient for the
earlier ruling, will sometimes be a delicate task. This assessment is easiest, of course, when
essentially only one review-fact is offered to support an outcome. In Ballew v. Georgia, for
example, the Court rested its holding that the Constitution does not permit juries of less than six
members on the single basis that panels are less effective when their numbers fall below a certain
total, with six somewhat arbitrarily chosen as minimally required under the Constitution.259
Similarly, viability is based on a fairly concrete and unitary empirical proposition – the point-intime when a fetus can survive outside the womb. In contrast, in Roper v. Simmons,260 the
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empirical arguments were somewhat more multifarious. The Court listed three factual bases for
concluding that those who kill as juveniles cannot be subject to capital punishment under the
Eighth Amendment. These included surveys of state law indicating acceptance or renunciation
of such punishments, the physiological and psychological developmental differences between
children and adults, and surveys of international practice and opinion. Suppose, after some
period of time, the evidence for one of these three premises indicates a changed empirical
landscape, should a lower court be entitled to rely on that basis alone to distinguish the Roper
precedent? The answer is that there is no definite answer. Like most aspects of constitutional
law, there is no doctrinal recipe to use under such circumstances. The lower court would have to
determine to the best of its capacity whether the fact that has changed was the central premise for
the otherwise controlling precedent. It might be, for instance, that a changed landscape as
regards state death penalty practices would be enough, but not if the changed landscape concerns
international standards. But this is a judgment call.

Moreover, before challenging an established precedent, a lower court would also have to
find that the research data are substantial enough to support the new empirical conclusion. The
question for courts in subsequent cases would be whether research conducted after the earlier
decision was substantial enough to warrant reaching a different conclusion than was reached in
the earlier case. In the situation of the 24-hour waiting provision, for example, lower courts
would not be able to reassess the research data that had been available to the Court in 1992 when
Casey was decided. A court’s assessment of an existing body of research data should be binding
on lower courts. In fact, lower courts should act in this realm only when the research data are
very robust and largely unambiguous. This is especially so when a Supreme Court precedent is
in issue. Given the gravity of distinguishing a Supreme Court decision on a factual basis, lower
courts should, and can be expected to, tread carefully over the new research terrain.

There are an assortment of significant advantages that come from adopting a procedural
rule by which lower courts can reevaluate precedent when research data clearly indicate that
accompanying text.
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predicate constitutional review-facts have substantially changed. First of all, it advances the
legitimacy of constitutional law-making by keeping it in line with contemporary knowledge of
the facts underlying constitutional decisions. As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. put it, “It is
revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of
Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished
long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.”261 When a
constitutional rule depends on a stated set of facts, the legitimacy of the outcome is undermined
to the extent that those facts are not what the court says they are. The rule ought to fit the facts as
they are known today.

In addition, giving lower courts authority to reconsider constitutional review-facts will
have a salutary effect on the Supreme Court’s sometimes harum-scarum reliance on such facts in
its jurisprudence. Just the knowledge that lower courts might revisit factual premises for their
holdings should lead the justices to be more careful in explaining the reasons for their decisions.
In Brown, for example, few, if any, constitutional scholars believe that the social science research
was anything more than a make-weight for an outcome reached on other grounds. But what were
those other grounds and why didn’t the Court simply cite them instead? The truth is that in the
early 1950s none of the usual constitutional authorities unambiguously supported the outcome.
The text itself was ambiguous, the precedent was weak or contrary, and original intent was
inconclusive. Social scientific authority provided a seemingly neutral basis for the outcome,
though in retrospect it was not seriously relied upon. Similarly, in Roe, it appears fairly clear that
Justice Blackmun used “viability” as a convenient placeholder for a sensible compromise
between the fundamental right of women to control their bodies and the compelling interests of
the state. Although Webster might suggest otherwise, I suspect that few constitutional scholars
(or justices) believe that if viability were to move, say, to 10-weeks, the abortion right would
follow suit. By giving lower courts the authority to reconsider precedents based on outmoded
review-fact premises, the Court should hesitate before expounding empirical reasons that are not
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real reasons for the outcome.

It might be argued, however, that taking away the Court’s ability to find facts
“normatively” or “interpretively” will limit the Court’s flexibility to achieve outcomes it wishes
to reach. Only if facts are understood interpretively can they be used rhetorically to support
whatever outcome is sought. Especially when the Court operates at the vanguard of societal
evolution, as it did in Brown and Roe, when traditional authorities militate against the
“enlightened” path the Court wishes to take, interpretive facts might play an essential rhetorical
role. And, indeed, one should be reluctant to advocate any jurisprudential approach that would
have made deciding Brown more difficult.

Although I am sympathetic to the argument that the Court sometimes needs the latitude
interpretive fact-finding gives it, I ultimately find it unpersuasive. The principal reason the Court
relies on scientific arguments, as in Brown and Roe, is that the usual so-called neutral principles
of interpretation are not available. The Court, ever solicitous of its legitimacy, which has been
historically associated with restraint and reliance on neutral principles, is reluctant to sometimes
give the true reason for its decisions.262 It was easier to say in Brown that social science revealed
the inequality that was inherent in segregation than to say that the Court had reached the moral
conclusion that segregation was wrong under virtually all circumstances, despite an ambiguous
text, contrary precedent, and original intent that was, under only the most generous historical
view, inconclusive. The argument from a moral basis makes the justices seem platonic
guardians. Science possesses the mien of neutrality, rather than the stink of judicial activism.
Similarly, in Roe, viability as a scientific concept sounded more neutral than an opinion that
instituted an “arbitrary” line at 24-weeks, on the basis of little more than that at least five justices
agreed that it was a reasonable compromise between two fundamental and irreconcilable
principles.
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The approach proposed here would thus take an important rhetorical arrow out of the
Court’s quiver. It might also weaken the Court’s legitimacy, to the extent anyone paying
attention continues to believe that members of the Court actually adhere exclusively to nonsubjective neutral principles for their constitutional opinions. To the extent that taking facts
seriously will accomplish anything, it is hoped that it will lead the Court to be more plain-spoken
about the reasons for what it does. This might pierce the judicial veil, but it will contribute in
one very salutary way more generally. In the United States, the people are the ultimate
sovereign. The people, therefore, should be fully engaged in the dialogue that takes place every
time the Court decides a constitutional case. If the bases for decision are hidden beneath a
scientific facade, and the true reasons are not made plain, then meaningful dialogue cannot occur.
The Court, perhaps, has no greater obligation than giving reasons for its decisions. It should be
candid about those reasons. Anything less and its legitimacy should be jeopardized.

Another significant advantage of giving the authority to lower courts to reevaluate
constitutional review-facts is that it will facilitate the introduction of new information into the
law. Although discovery of constitutional review-facts is not limited to the adversarial process –
since they can be brought to the attention of courts through amicus briefs or even independent
research – they are likely to be developed most fully if first put into issue at the trial court level.
The multiple-layers of the trial and appellate process are well-suited to the full exploration and
development of the empirical record upon which disputed constitutional review-facts rest.
Moreover, the courts’ taking constitutional facts seriously sends an important message to
researchers. Good research will be valued and potentially relied upon whenever it is done.
Previous decisions relying on early research data, therefore, do not foreclose reconsideration in
light of the publication of substantial new data.

One striking change that would follow from a jurisprudence that permits lower courts to
reconsider constitutional review-facts would be on the Supreme Court’s control over its own
docket. By distinguishing a controlling precedent on the basis of changed constitutional reviewfacts, a federal appellate court or a state’s highest court could effectively force the Supreme
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Court to grant certiorari.263 The Court uses its control over its docket partly to manage the
timing of constitutional decisions, sometimes waiting a considerable period for an issue to
mature in the lower courts. The rule proposed here would give lower courts some leverage in
forcing the High Court to enter a field (or return to a field) when, perhaps, the Justices would
have preferred to let it simmer for awhile longer or avoid the issue altogether.

Although loss of full control of its docket is a danger of the proposed rule, it is not one of
great consequence. Even when the Supreme Court feels its hand has been forced, it need not
issue an opinion that resolves the dispute on the merits. In the most extreme instances, the Court
could reverse the lower court summarily, simply as being contrary to controlling precedent, and
provide no further explanation. This is not likely to happen often, however, since the Court may
feel compelled to explain why the changed factual situation does not alter the application of the
constitutional rule. It might also be argued that the Court’s loss of some control over its docket
could itself be a salutary event. There is nothing sacred about the Court’s certiorari power and,
indeed, such absolute control is a relatively recent phenomenon. The proposed rule injects a
measure of democracy into the High Court’s docket, an outcome that might increase its
responsiveness to the pressing and most dynamic issues of the day.

Finally, it is worth emphasizing that lower courts are unlikely to exercise their power to
distinguish higher court precedent very frequently. They are likely to do so only when they have
enough empirical ammunition to overwhelm the opposing precedent. This will not occur often.
In most of the areas in which the Court employs empirical arguments, there is limited amounts of
research available and much of it tends to be fairly soft social science. Even a considerable
number of research studies on many social science subjects will not be enough to sustain a
court’s reconsideration of a higher court’s holding in a particular review-fact context. Also,
many of the empirical questions the Court resolves concern highly complex matters that even the
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best efforts of mainstream scientists will not soon conquer. In Kansas v. Crane,264 for instance,
the Court discussed the scientific research involved in defining “lack of volitional control,” the
principal component of the mental abnormality requirement in the commitment of sexually
violent predators.265 Psychologists, psychiatrists, and neuroscientists are some distance from
obtaining a good understanding of this construct. Many of the facts the Court employs share this
level of complexity. Once the Court has weighed in with a review of the evidence and has
provided an answer based on contemporary research, a lower court should be disinclined to
revisit any particular constitutional review-fact without substantial research data supporting its
holding. As Holmes, quoting Emerson, said, “When you strike at a king, you must kill him.”266

IV. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court approaches fact-finding much as the Catholic Church did in the
Sixteenth Century. Facts are not so much found as they are interpreted. Facts are a constituent
part of doctrine. The High Court employs empirical claims to buttress its reading of the
constitutional text, but scientific refutations of these claims have little or no effect on the Court’s
continuing adherence to the doctrines built upon them. Just as was true for the Church, however,
the Court’s continued adherence to doctrines founded on faith rather than modern empiricism
threatens its very legitimacy.

In this Article, I set forth a uniform theory of constitutional facts. This theory is offered
as a substitution for the Court’s interpretive approach, in which facts merely serve the doctrinal
ends sought by the justices. The Court’s approach does have the salutary effect of avoiding
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changeable constitutional standards due to changed understandings of the empirical world. This
stability comes at a cost, however, for a rule that has outlived its reasons for being is no longer
legitimate. But there is no inherent contradiction between enlightened factual investigation and a
sound constitutional jurisprudence. Constitutional doctrine should be informed by contemporary
understandings of the empirical world. This Article provides a framework by which this might
be accomplished.

Facts arise in constitutional adjudication in a variety of forms. Using Professor Kenneth
Culp Davis’ famous dichotomy between legislative and adjudicative facts as a springboard, I set
forth a taxonomy by which the variety of constitutional fact-finding can be understood. In
constitutional cases, Davis’ scheme must be refined to account for three basic types of
constitutional facts – rule-facts, review-facts, and adjudicative-facts. Constitutional rule-facts are
relevant to the definition of a rule or standard to be applied in a set of cases. These facts are
instrumental in the process of interpreting the Constitution’s meaning and are typically used in
conjunction with, and are sometimes a component of, traditional constitutional authorities, such
as the text, precedent, original intent, and constitutional structure. Perhaps the best-known type
of constitutional rule-facts are historical facts used to determine “original intent.” In contrast, the
remaining two categories of facts are associated with the application of constitutional rules or
standards. Constitutional review-facts involve facts that are relevant under a particular
interpretation of the Constitution and which transcend individual cases. In Roe v. Wade, for
instance, the Court adopted “viability” – the point in time when the fetus can survive outside the
womb – as the time at which the state’s interests in prohibiting abortions becomes “compelling.”
The scientific answer to the question of when “viability” occurs is a constitutional review-fact.
Constitutional adjudicative-facts similarly involve the application of the Constitution, but they
are peculiar to individual cases. Examples of constitutional adjudicative-facts abound, including
determining “actual malice” under New York Times v. Sullivan, and assessing whether a
particular photograph appeals to the prurient interest under local community standards, as
directed by the Millertest.
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Because constitutional facts vary so widely – from rule-facts such as whether small
republics are better guarantors of liberty than large republics to adjudicative-facts such as
whether a municipal police department intentionally discriminated against plaintiffs on the basis
of race – the procedural guidelines that apply to them must account for this variability in a
practical way. In particular, two procedural aspects of proof must be considered in the
development of a rational scheme of constitutional fact-finding. The first concerns the question
of the kinds of evidence that are available to prove constitutional facts and the methods by which
such proof is to be evaluated. The second concerns the matter of allocating burdens of proof and,
in particular, determining how the costs of error are to be allocated between the parties to
constitutional cases. The problem of establishing evidentiary standards and allocating burdens of
proof depends greatly on the sort of constitutional facts that are in dispute. Constitutional
adjudicative-facts lend themselves readily to traditional evidentiary rules and burdens of proof,
since they are particular to the case and are determined by triers of fact (judges or juries) in the
course of ordinary trial processes. In contrast, while review- and rule-facts can be the subject of
trial processes, they very often are introduced into the process through amicus briefs and
independent judicial investigation, and sometimes are even found in the first instance by
appellate courts. Hence, while the issues of establishing standards for, and allocating burdens of,
proof are present in regard to all constitutional facts, these issues manifest themselves very
differently for the different forms constitutional facts take.

In addition to, and a component of, the multiple kinds of facts used in constitutional cases
is the wide assortment of fact-finders situated along the path of constitutional adjudication. I
examine three principal subjects raised by the issue of the identity of the constitutional factfinder. The first concerns the role of the jury in constitutional cases and, in particular, whether
reviewing courts owe deference to the fact-finding of juries. The second involves a large subject
in constitutional law, that of judicial review of legislative fact-finding. Finally, third, I consider a
subject that might appear somewhat esoteric, but which largely encapsulates many of the basic
issues surrounding the choice of constitutional theories of fact-finding that might be available to
the Court. This last issue involves the question whether lower courts might sometimes be able to
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depart from precedent on the basis that the facts on which that authority was set have changed, or
our knowledge of them has changed. I conclude that lower courts sometimes should not have
this power (in the case of constitutional rule-facts), but very often should have this power (in the
case of constitutional review- and adjudicative-facts).
In Abrams v. United States,267 Justice Holmes, in a dissenting opinion, hypothesized “that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market.”268 He added, somewhat laconically: “That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.
It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.”269 Holmes, as perhaps the first legal realist, well
understood the interaction between the Constitution’s words and societal consequences. The
Constitution may promulgate theories, but only life provides empirical test. A well-functioning
Constitution must be fully grounded in the empirical world and responsive to empirical demands.
A Constitution is measured by its practical consequences. Constitutional provisions divorced
from the world in which they operate are destined to become empty articles of faith. Their
legitimacy resting on dictate rather than reason. Our Constitution was “intended to endure for
ages to come,” and, as a consequence, must “be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs.”270 Only through a candid and realistic constitutional fact jurisprudence will this
intention be met.
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